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Abstract 
We construct a novel hand-collected large data set of 205 U.S. hedge funds and 1031 activist 
events over the period 2005-2013, which records both the Schedule 13D filing date and the 
voicing date, and explore the role of voicing in value creation. We employ alternative 
inferential statistical approaches, including parametric, non-parametric, and  
heteroscedasticity-robust tests along with bootstrapping. We reveal that the voice date is 
important in creating short-term firm value, and provide strong evidence that voicing is 
associated with positive abnormal returns. These abnormal returns are approximately 1.11%, 
and are higher than the abnormal returns around the Schedule13D date by approximately 
64%. There is also evidence of positive voice abnormal returns for voicing events which lead 
Schedule 13D events. The results are robust to models of abnormal returns allowing for 
leverage effects, and to alternative inferential statistical procedures. These findings suggest 
that voicing leads to information revelation, with implications for U.S. stock market arbitrage 
and the regulation for hedge fund activism information disclosure.  
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1. Introduction 
Hedge fund activism is an investment strategy where a hedge fund intervenes in a target firm 
with a minority stake and influences the firm’s internal decisions. The main objective of this 
intervention is to reduce agency costs, increase firm’s performance and maximize shareholder 
value. Prior literature suggests that increased management monitoring by shareholder activists 
reduces agency and incentive costs (Brav et al. (2008); Gilson and Gordon (2013)), especially 
when activists gain board representation (Goodwin (2016)). Top activist investors target firms 
with higher agency costs and are more successful in their activist goals when engaging in 
monitoring management (Krishnan et al. (2016)). Taking the Schedule 13D1 filing date as the 
critical date of an activist event, empirical contributions have documented that the stock 
market reacts favorably to activism, yielding positive average abnormal returns for target 
firms around that date, and suggesting that hedge fund activism creates value (Becht et al. 
(2008); Brav et al. (2008a); Brav et al. (2008b); Clifford (2008); Klein and Zur (2009); 
Greenwood and Schor (2009); Boyson and Mooradian (2011); Gow et al. (2014); Bebchuk et 
al. (2015); Becht et al. (2017))2.  Although short-term effects have been examined around the 
Schedule 13D filing date, there is hardly any evidence on the short-term abnormal returns 
surrounding the amendment dates.  
The present paper departs from the previous literature in that it considers as critical dates of 
an activist event not only the Schedule 13D date but also the amendment date that contains 
voice. We define this date as voice date. In fact, we expect voice to carry at least the same 
importance as the Schedule 13D. The motivation for considering the voice date arises from 
the fact that this is the date when a hedge fund clearly asks, proposes, differentiates or 
demands operational, strategic, corporate governance or capital allocation changes in the 
“Item 4” section3. Through voice, activists become more specific about their objectives by 
revealing their internal assessment and disclosing specific plans or proposals for the target 
firm. So, we hypothesize that voice functions as an information revelation mechanism. In 
                                               
1 Schedule 13D is commonly referred to as a “beneficial ownership report”. The term "beneficial 
owner" is defined under SEC rules and includes any person who directly or indirectly shares voting 
power or investment power (the power to sell the security) - (SEC). Investors, who acquire beneficial 
ownership of more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, are required to disclose a Schedule 13D with the SEC 
within 10 days from the transaction (https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html). 
2 As the event window becomes longer, abnormal returns increase (Brav et al. (2008);  Krishnan et al. 
(2016)). Interestingly, positive abnormal returns are obtained even when hedge funds had previously 
disclosed a smaller stake at the target firm through the 13F filing (Brav et al. (2008)). Moreover, 
significant performance improvements are obtained when hedge funds switch from passive (Schedule 
13G filing) to active (Schedule 13D filing) with no ownership change (Brav et al. (2015)). These 
performance improvements occurred due to the hedge fund’s decision to switch from passive to active; 
otherwise they would not have been implemented. 
3 In “Item 4” section investors state the “Purpose of Transaction”.  
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contrast, if the hedge fund activists do not state any specific plans or proposals through the 
Schedule 13D or Schedule 13D/A filings, we define those interventions as non-voice. In these 
interventions, activists may either make amendments for beneficial ownership changes or not 
make amendments at all until exit. So far, the vast majority of existing literature assumes that 
the activism engagement process is initiated by the Schedule 13D filing and terminates with 
exit. However, Schedule 13D filings which do not contain voice,  simply signal an activist 
intention, which may occur or not. The stock price of the targeted firm at Schedule 13D filing 
date should reflect the expected value of two mutually exclusive events: the specific 
intervention activist purpose and  the lack of such disclosed purpose. On the other hand, voice 
specifies the activism field since hedge funds  disclose specific proposalsand/or plans. The 
stock price of the targeted firm  at voice date should reflect the expected value of a successful, 
a failed or a settlement outcome, multiplied by the corresponding probabilities of occurrence. 
Although both dates are considered as dates of the activism engagement process initiation, 
they reflect different expected future outcomes. The goal of this paper is to investigate how 
investors react to hedge fund activism (voice) and to the announcement of a possible activism 
(Schedule 13D filing without voice). These two different initiation engagement dates are also  
compared in terms of abnormal return behavior.  
 
Further motivation for focusing on the voice date is provided by the following examples of 
anecdotal evidence. On August 22, 2011, Starboard Value LP filed a Schedule 13D indicating 
an 8.9% beneficial ownership of Mips Technologies Inc. In the “Item 4” section, the reporting 
persons expressed their belief that that the shares were undervalued and did not have any 
plans or proposals4. On September 13, 2011, Starboard Value LP filed a Schedule 13D/A 
stating that they delivered a letter to the board of the company on September 12, 2011 
nominating specific people for election to the company’s Board of Directors, and urging the 
company to discontinue pursuing acquisitions, focus on improving its operating performance 
and consider buying back shares. As a result, the stock return of Mips Technologies on that 
date (September, 12) was 6.19%, much higher than that on the Schedule 13D filing date 
(August, 22) which was 0.46%. This echoes the relatively important role of voice in driving 
market responses. We consider this event as a voice event, and set September 12, 2011 as 
voice date where Starboard Value LP delivered the letter to Mips Technologies Inc5.  
                                               
4https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1059786/000092189511001772/sc13da106297098_09122
011.htm 
5 Notably, Starboard Value LP had already filed a DFAN14A filing on September 12, 2011. 
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The second example refers to Atlantic Investment Management  Inc. (AIM) filing a Schedule 
13D on September 14, 2012, indicating a 5,05% beneficial ownership of Rockwood Holdings, 
Inc. On that date, the firm’s stock return was +1.84%. In the “Item 4” section, the reporting 
persons stated that they acquired the stock for investment purposes and did not have any 
current plans6. On November 19, 2012, AIM filed an amendment where a beneficial owner 
increase was stated to 6.05% without amending the “Item 4” section. On that date, the stock 
return was +2%. AIM exited on January 29, 2013 filing a Schedule 13D/A stating a beneficial 
ownership of 4.89%. On the exit date the stock return was +0.5% We consider this as a non-
voice event since AIM did not state any specific plans in any of its filings’ “Item 4” section, 
and use the initial Schedule 13D date as the non-voice date. 
We carefully collected a large sample of 205 U.S. hedge funds and 1031 activist events over 
the period 2005-2013. This data set is novel because it records both the Schedule 13D and the 
voice dates, and includes 379 voice and 652 non-voice events. Using this sample, we explored 
whether positive abnormal returns exist surrounding the voice date.  Our findings strongly 
suggest that there exist positive abnormal returns not only surrounding the Schedule 13D date 
but also the voice date, suggesting value creation around the voice date as well. The abnormal 
returns around the voice date are approximately 1.11%, and are higher than the abnormal 
returns around the Schedule 13D date by approximately 64%.  These findings are robust to 
alternative asset pricing models controlling for size, book to market, momentum, and 
GARCH-in-Mean effects. They are also robust to alternative parametric and non-parametric 
statistical procedures for inference on the significance of abnormal returns, including the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test, and the rank test procedure of Corrado (1989) and Corrado and 
Zivney (1992). The abnormal returns of Schedule13D and voice dates are also statistically 
compared by means of a battery of heteroscedasticity and skewness-robust tests. We 
document significant differences in the market inefficiency patterns. Our interpretation is 
that the Schedule 13D date reveals only partial information, with the remainder of 
information being revealed at voice.  As we record both the voice and the Schedule 13D 
dates, we also consider the case of 93 events in which the voice date leads the Schedule 13D 
filing date by less than 10 trading days. We find evidence that for these events as well there 
exist positive voice abnormal returns, suggesting that voicing, regardless of whether it occurs 
before or after the Schedule 13D date, entails information revelation which triggers market 
response. These results are in line with Becht et al. (2017) who, using a sample of 
international activist events, found that positive short-term abnormal returns exist surrounding 
                                               
6 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1063296/000090571812000245/sc13rockwood0912.htm 
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the amendment dates when activists disclose outcomes, such as board representation and 
takeovers, through amendments.  
Our results have implications for information revelation, market quality and arbitrage 
opportunities, and regulation for hedge fund activism mandatory disclosure. The voice date 
and the Schedule 13D date, which in general do not coincide, are two important hallmarks of 
mandatory disclosure regulation for hedge fund activism. Positive abnormal returns on both 
dates, and not only the Schedule 13D date, indicate opportunities for arbitrage. Arbitrage is 
detrimental for stock market quality. As mandatory disclosure regulation should, in principle, 
aim at improving market quality, our findings point to the need of revisiting the way that 
hedge fund activism related information is disclosed in the market. This need is in line with 
the ongoing debate on whether mandatory disclosure regulation has net positive or negative 
effects on stock market quality (Enriques and Gilotta (2015); Greenstone et al. (2006)), as 
well as with recent legal scholars' recommendations for significant modification of U.S. 
securities markets regulation (Mahoney (1997)).  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data set and the voice date. 
Section 3 outlines the methodology for abnormal returns, spells out the hypotheses to be 
tested, and discusses the statistical procedures. Section 4 reports the empirical findings, 
discusses their implications, and makes a regulatory policy recommendation. Section 5 
provides several robustness checks, including various GARCH-type models for calculating 
abnormal returns, and non-parametric tests for statistical inference. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The data set, and voice dates. 
2.1. Compiling the data set 
We obtained Schedule 13D filings between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2013 using the 
Historical SEC Edgar Archives from the Edgar Database of the SEC7. Our search for “SC 
13D” gave us 11.700 filers from a total of 19.352 filings8.  
The next step was to identify the hedge funds9. Although in the literature there is not a 
commonly accepted definition for hedge funds (Brav et al. (2008a)), we formed our sample of 
hedge funds following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), and Griffin and Xu (2009). We 
                                               
7 https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar 
8 We manually downloaded the list of Schedule 13D filers searching for “SC 13D” per month for the 
research period since there is a limitation of 4000 documents. 
9The term 'hedge fund' refers to privately organized pooled investment vehicles, administered by 
professional managers, and not widely available to the public. Hedge funds do not fall in the regulation 
for mutual funds for the investors’ protection, and are not restricted to certain levels of liquidity; they 
usually require investors to keep their money in the fund for a specific period of time.  
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searched the Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website10 for each of the “Reporting 
Persons”11 of the Schedule 13D filings and included in our sample only firms that were 
registered as investment advisers with the SEC and thus, filed the ADV form12. Next, we 
searched the “Item 5” section (“Information About Your Advisory Business - Employees, 
Clients, and Compensation”) and included in our sample only those firms that at least 50% of 
their clients were “Other Pooled Investment Vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” or “High Net 
Worth Individuals” and charged performance-based fees.  
On the basis of these steps, we identified 321 “pure-play” hedge funds13 which filed a total of 
2.098 Schedule 13D filings. We excluded from our sample financial firms14, private firms and 
activist events that were still live at the end of December 2013. Our final sample consists of 
205 hedge funds and 1.031 activist events (379 voice and 652 non-voice events). The stock 
prices of our sample were downloaded from Thomson DataStream (TDS). Descriptive 
statistics for all stock returns and for the stock returns that comprise each event-based 
category are reported in Table 1, and indicate evidence of non-normality.  
2.2. Voice dates 
Hedge funds follow different strategies in order to maximize shareholder value and increase 
firm’s performance. These strategies concern the hedge funds’ plans or proposals for the 
target firm and the timing of their disclosure. Plans or proposals must be disclosed in the 
“Item 4” section, and contain changes in a firm’s corporate governance (i.e. changes in board 
structure and composition), strategy (i.e. sell of company, spin-off of a subsidiary), capital 
allocation (i.e. buy back shares, special dividends) and operational performance. There are 
many cases though, where hedge funds exit the target firm without publicly stating any of the 
above objectives.  
The timing of disclosure varies according to the activists’ strategies. Activists could disclose 
their objectives either in their initial Schedule 13D filing following a more offensive agenda, 
or later by filing an amendment stating their objectives publicly15. Since investors have a 10-
                                               
10 https://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/default.aspx 
11 The ‘Reporting Persons” are stated in the “Item 2’ section (“Identity and Background”) of the 
Schedule 13D filing. 
12 Form ADV is the uniform form used by investment advisers to register with both the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and state securities authorities. For example, David Knott was the filer 
of a Schedule 13D filing on January 11, 2008 concerning Pet DRx Corp. The “Reporting Persons” of 
this filing where David Knott and Dorset Management Corporation (DMC). DMC fulfilled our criteria. 
If we had not followed this procedure, we would have excluded David’s Knott Schedule 13D filings 
from our sample. 
13 Ben-David, Itzhak, et al. (2013) 
14 SIC code 6000 to 6799 
15 In some cases, activists state their proposals without filing a Schedule 13D at all (activism under the 
5% threshold). These cases are not included in our sample. 
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day window to file their beneficial ownership with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), the disclosure date, which we define as the voice date, does not 
necessarily match with the Schedule 13D or the Schedule 13D/A filing date.  
We search for voice in “Item 4” section (Purpose of Transaction) of the initial Schedule 13D, 
its amendments (Schedule 13D/A) and the attached Exhibits. Activist interventions are 
usually followed by amendments (Schedule 13D/A) where hedge funds make material 
changes in facts set forth in the initial Schedule 13D filing16. If a hedge fund states the exact 
date of voice in these filings we consider this date as the voice date, otherwise we use the 
filing date. We hypothesize that voice events generate positive short-term abnormal returns, 
since important information becomes available to investors at the voice date. We include in 
our sample only the first voice incident of an activist intervention.  
In our voice events, the average difference between the identified voice date and the Schedule 
13D date is + 40 trading days or 56 calendar days, namely the voice date lags the Schedule 
13D date by 40 trading days. Importantly, we identified  93 events in which voicing leads 
Schedule 13D by 1 to 10 trading days, namely the voice day is in the space (-1, -10) of the 
Schedule 13D day. This point is taken into consideration when assessing the statistical 
significance of abnormal returns of voice; by looking not only at all voice events but also at 
this category of voice events leading the Schedule 13D events by 1 to 10 days. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Abnormal returns of targeted firms 
Our objective is to explore whether there exist statistically significant abnormal returns for the 
targeted firm around the hedge fund activism announcement date (Schedule 13D date), the 
announcement of voice activism (voice date), and the ex-post announcement that hedge fund 
activism did not eventually happen in terms of voice (non-voice). The time period of interest 
for which we observe the three event types, denoted as the event period, covers 20 pre-event 
days (day -20 to day -1), the event date (day 0), and 20 post-event days (day 1 to day 20). The 
event window is expanded by 20 days prior to the event in order to capture possible 
information leaks, and by 20 days after the event to account for possible delayed response of 
investors to announcements.   
                                               
16 Such changes may include changes in their beneficial ownership and plans or proposals stated in 
“Item 4” section. In “Item 4” section investors state the “Purpose of Transaction”. 
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Abnormal returns are assessed in terms of the realized returns and the returns that would be 
normally expected by the market. Following Brown and Warner (1980), an abnormal return 
itAR  is defined as the difference between the actual return itR of stock i at the event day t 
and the expected stock return at the event day t predicted by an estimated asset pricing model: 
                        tititit DRERAR                                                                                       (1)                                                                                  
where  ,log*100 1 ititit PPR  itP  is the actual price of stock i at event day t , i = 1,2,…,N 
with N the total number of stocks, while
 
 tit DRE  denotes the expected stock returns given 
the information set tD  available at time period t. The expected returns represent the “normal” 
returns, namely the returns that would be anticipated if no event took place. The expected 
returns are predictions for the event day, generated by an asset pricing model fitted to the 
actual stock returns over an estimation window. The estimation window represents the sample 
proportion of the data that precedes the event period.  In this paper, the length of the 
estimation window is determined in terms of data availability. In particular, the estimation 
period for each stock starts at the first available stock return observation, and ends 21 days 
before the announcement date. Our results are also verified by using an estimation window of 
fixed length to calculate the abnormal returns. 
Abnormal stock returns of the targeted firms are calculated using the market model and the 
multi-factor model of Carhart (1997). The market model assumes that the returns of each 
stock are linearly related to the market portfolio returns. The following linear regression 
model is estimated by least squares  
                itftmtit uRRaR  10                                                                                      (2) 
where mtR denotes the S&P 500 market index returns, and ft
R denotes the risk –free rate.  
In the Carhart (1997) model, the conventional market model is enhanced by the size, value,      
and momentum factors: 
 
    ,43210 ittttftmtit uMOMHMLSMBRRaR                                 (3) 
where tSMB denotes the size factor - the difference between the returns on portfolios based 
on stocks with small market capitalization  and stocks with big market capitalization, tHML  
represents the value factor - the difference between the returns on portfolios based on stocks 
with high book-to-market ratios and stocks with low book-to-market ratios, and tMOM  
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represents the momentum factor - the difference between the returns on portfolios of the 
winners and losers of the previous year.  
We finally consider the GARCH-in-Mean model, as asset pricing theory suggests that higher 
risk has to be compensated with a higher expected return. Thus, we include a measure of 
stock return volatility as a term in the generating mechanism of expected returns. Lundblad 
(2007) provides evidence supporting the adoption of the GARCH-in-Mean model, and shows 
that market’s risk premium and conditional volatility are positively related. Ang et al. (2006) 
document that market volatility is a priced factor of the cross-sectional stock returns and 
therefore, market volatility should be included in a pricing model in addition to the market 
factor. Adrian and Rosenberg (2008) decompose market volatility into two factors, and find 
that the CAPM extended by these two factors price stock returns better than other pricing 
models.  Motivated by these empirical findings, we consider the following specification for 
the returns generating mechanism17 
  ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR                (3a) 
  ,2/1ititit hu                                                                                                       (3b) 
,12
2
110   ititit hukh                                                                                         
(3c)              
where  it  is a sequence of random variables which are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed as Student’s t with unknown degrees of freedom, while  ith  is the 
sequence of conditional variances which evolve as a GARCH (1, 1) process. The constant 0k , 
as well as the ARCH and GARCH coefficient parameters ,2,1, ii are estimated using the 
quasi-maximum likelihood method.  
 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide a pictorial representation of the abnormal returns for the Schedule 
13D, voice and non-voice events, calculated using these 3 alternative models for the period (-
20, +20) in relation to each event. Based on these abnormal returns, we next proceed to 
formulating and testing the hypotheses of interest.  
 
3.2. Market responses to Schedule 13D, voice, and non-voice: Hypotheses and testing. 
                                               
17 In the Section exploring robustness, we also consider GARCH-type models allowing for asymmetric 
volatility effects, such as the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) and the GARCH-GJR models. 
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Our objective is to investigate the stock market response to the announcement of voice 
activism initiation in relation to other hedge fund activism announcements, such as the initial 
Schedule 13D filings announcement (Schedule 13D), and the announcement where hedge 
funds did not eventually disclose any plans or proposals (non-voice) until exit. This is done 
by testing the following null hypotheses: 
 
          ,0:0 StAH  against 0:1 StAH  ,                                                                           (4) 
         ,0:0 VtBH  against 0:1 VtBH  ,                                                                            (5) 
         ,0:0 NVtCH  against 0:1 NVtCH  ,                                                                        (6) 
where   ,,,, NVSVjARE jtjt   denotes the expected value  of the abnormal returns of 
the specific event-based category j at event date t, with V, S, NV denoting the stocks which 
comprise the voice, Schedule 13D and non-voice event categories, respectively.  
 
The null hypothesis AH 0  states that the stock market does not respond to the announcement 
of hedge fund activism initiation based on the information at the Schedule 13D filings 
announcements. Similarly, the stock market is hypothesized not to respond to voice 
announcements or the announcements of hedge fund activism which eventually does not take 
place under null hypotheses BH 0  and CH 0 , respectively.  The null hypotheses (4)-(6) are 
formulated based on the fact that an event will have no impact on stock returns if the average 
of the cross-sectional abnormal returns at the particular date is equal to zero. 
 
Parametric and non-parametric tests are employed to examine the no mean event effect 
hypotheses. The parametric t-statistic is defined as 
 *
*
t
t
s
Ntestt


                                                                                                                 (7) 
where ,
1
1
* 


N
i
itt AR
N
  and    




N
t
titt AR
N
s
1
2**
1
1
 .  
The test-statistic is computed by regressing the abnormal returns on a constant and then 
testing the statistical significance of the constant parameter. Under the null hypothesis that the 
mean abnormal returns are equal to zero, the test statistic is distributed as Student’s t with N – 
1 degrees of freedom.  
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We also consider an additional testing approach which relies on the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (Wilcoxon (1945)). According to Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), the Wilcoxon 
test outperforms the parametric test in terms of finite sample power especially when it is 
applied to data which are fat tailed- distributed.  This test takes into account both the sign and 
the magnitude of the abnormal returns, while it does not require normality of the abnormal 
returns to achieve proper specification under the null hypothesis. Consider the statistical 
measure for a specific event day t: 
        ,0
1



N
i
ititititt ARmARKARmARIW                                              (8) 
where  itARm  is the median of the cross-sectional abnormal returns itAR ,  .K  denotes the 
ranking order of the data according to their relative magnitude,  0~  itit RAARI  is an 
indicator function that assigns the value 1 when the condition 0
~
 itit RAAR  is satisfied and 
0 otherwise. It is assumed that none of the absolute values are equal, while these values are 
non-zero. The signed-ranked test statistic is defined as 
      
2/1,
12
)12)(1(
4
)1(





 



NNN
NN
W
z
t
tW
.                                                                                        (9) 
Under the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns are generated from a distribution whose 
median is zero, tWz ,  is distributed as standard normal
18.  
 
3.3. Testing for different market reaction across different hedge fund activism events 
Further, we investigate the possibility that the market reacts differently to those events by 
testing the following hypotheses: 
       ,0:0  StVtDH  against 0:1  StVtDH  ,                                                         (10) 
       ,0:0  StVtDH  against 0:1  StVtDRH  ,                                                        (11) 
      ,0:0  StVtDH  against 0:1  StVtDLH  ,                                                         (12) 
      ,0:0  NVtVtEH  against 0:1  NVtVtEH  ,                                                       (13) 
      ,0:0  NVtVtEH  against 0:1  NVtVtERH  ,                                                      (14) 
                                               
18 In the Section addressing robustness, we consider additional inferential statistical procedures. 
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      ,0:0  NVtVtEH  against 0:1  NVtVtELH  ,                                                       (15) 
where   ,,,, NVSVjSARE jtjt   denotes the expected value of the standardized 
abnormal returns of the specific event-based category j at event date t. The sample mean is 
used to estimate jt  . The standardized abnormal returns for each stock i are defined as  
         
 
,
it
it
it
AR
AR
SAR

                                                                                                       (16a) 
where   


1
1
2
1
1 L
t
itit u
kL
AR is the standard deviation of the regression prediction errors 
of each stock, k denotes the degrees of freedom, and 
1L  is the estimation window length. The 
parameter k is equal to one, four and five when the market model, the Carhart model, and the 
GARCH-in-Mean models are used, respectively. The standardization of the abnormal returns 
by their standard deviation allows conducting reliable inference on the difference between 
their sample means because these samples have unequal lengths. A standard two sample t-test 
of unequal variances that has been widely used in the literature is applied to the standardized 
abnormal returns to test hypotheses (10)-(15). In particular, the two sample t-test of Welch 
(1947) is defined as 
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                                                                                                    (16b) 
where 
2
Vs  and 
2
Ss  are the sample variances of the cross-sectional  standardized abnormal 
returns of voice and Schedule 13D event-based stocks respectively, while VN and SN are the 
total number of stocks of voice and Schedule 13D event-based categories, respectively. Under 
the null hypothesis that the difference of the two means is equal to zero, the test statistic is 
distributed as Student’s t with v degrees of freedom, where  
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with  . denoting the function that rounds down to the nearest integer the data. The t-test for 
the difference NVtVt    is defined similarly. The simulation results of Ruxton (2006) 
document that the Welch test is favourably compared to the conventional two sample t-test of 
equal variances in terms of empirical size.  
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3.4. Heteroscedasticity-robust and non-normality-robust tests 
Several studies on testing the mean equality hypothesis raise concerns about possible 
inferential biases associated with the application of the existing test procedures under the 
presence of non-normality and heteroscedasticity. For instance, Algina et al. (1994) show that 
the Welch test faces size distortions when applied to data which are non-normally distributed. 
Descriptive statistics of stock returns, presented in Table 1, do indicate departures from 
normality; moreover, heteroscadisticity is a common feature in stock returns.  
To allow for these stock returns characteristics in our testing procedure, we consider the 
Yuen’s (1974) trimmed mean based test. Wilcox (1997) documented that the Yuen’s (1974) 
test is well sized and demonstrates enhanced power under a sequence of local alternatives. 
More recently, Keselman et al. (2004) proved that a modified version of Yuen’s test, 
introduced by Guo and Luh (2000) and implemented in conjunction with bootstrap 
confidence intervals, performs satisfactorily in finite samples. Their test is also based on 
trimmed means and it ensures robustness to skewness.  
The two-sample trimmed mean tests of Yuen (1974), and Guo and Luh (2000) are applied to 
the standardized abnormal returns in order to evaluate hypotheses (10)-(15). The test 
procedures are summarized below. Let )()2()1( ... Njjj SARSARSAR  be the standardized 
abnormal returns of the event-based category j placed in ascending order. The sample 
trimmed mean of the category j is defined as 

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jt SAR
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)(
* 1 ,                                                                                                          (18) 
where jq denotes the lower and upper cut-off point of the distribution of the standardized 
abnormal returns, with  gNq j  , where    is the percentage of trimming applied to the tails 
of the distribution, and jj qNh 2 . Following the simulation results of Keselman et al. 
(2004), we set g equal to 10%. The Winsorized variance of the standardized abnormal returns 
is estimated as the sample variance of the Winsorized standardized abnormal returns: 
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Yuen’s (1974) test is defined as  
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where )1()1( 2\  jjWjj hhNp  .  
 
Guo and Luh (2000) proposed a modified version of Yuen’s test which filters out non-
parametrically possible excess skewness by using a Hall (1992) transformation to the original 
test statistic. Their test is defined as 
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Under the null hypothesis of mean equality, both test statistics are distributed as Student’s t 
with degrees of freedom equal to   
 
      )1()1( 222*  SSVVSV hphppp .                                                             (23)           
 
Bootstrap critical values are employed for inference. The bootstrap simulations were 
conducted on the basis of the following steps: First, calculate the zero-mean series 
*
jtjtjt SARL  for the standardized abnormal returns of each event-based category j. This 
transformation ensures that the empirical distributions of both samples jtL share a common 
measure of location. Second, generate bootstrap series jtL
~
of length N by randomly sampling 
with replacement from the original series  .jtL  Third, calculate the bootstrap test Yt
~
(or
Ht
~
) 
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using the bootstrap samples
jtL
~
. Fourth, calculate the test statistic 
Yt (or Ht ) using the actual 
data .jtL Fifth, repeat the first three steps of the procedure B times.  A sequence of B pseudo-
test values  B
bYb
t
1
~

 (or B
bHb
t
1
~

 ) is generated. In our empirical investigation, 2500 bootstrap 
replications are used.  Sixth, the null hypothesis of mean equality is rejected at level α if the 
condition  )1(~,~   YYY ttt is not satisfied, with Yt
~
and )1(
~
Yt representing the lower α and 
upper  (1 – α) percentile of the distribution of  B
bYb
t
1
~

, respectively.  
 
4. Empirical findings, implications, and regulatory policy recommendation 
4.1. Abnormal returns around the Schedule 13D announcement 
The results for testing the null hypothesis reflected in (4), namely that the stock market does 
not respond to the announcement of hedge fund activism initiation based on the information 
at the Schedule 13D filings announcements, is reported in Table 1a for the market model and 
the Carhart (1997) model of abnormal returns, and in Table 1b for the GARCH-in-Mean 
model with the normal distribution and the t-distribution.  Tables 1a and 1b report the 
abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the announcement date of the Schedule 13D 
filings,  the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns based on the 
parametric t-test in (7) (denoted as “p-val”), and the p-value of the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed rank test in (9). The last column in each Table presents the percentage of the positive 
abnormal returns for the event date.  
The results from Table 1a show that over the period (-1, +1) the abnormal returns are 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level, under both models of abnormal returns. In 
addition, there is evidence of statistical significance of abnormal returns for a period starting 9 
trading days prior to the Schedule 13D date, which is justified by the fact that the hedge fund 
has a deadline of 10 days to disclose the information. The rejection of the null hypothesis in 
(4), that the stock market does not respond to the Schedule 13D filings announcements, is 
supported by both the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon test. The statistically 
significant abnormal returns to Schedule 13D announcements are positive, suggesting short-
term value creation. Table 1b, for the GARCH-in-Mean model under the normal and under 
the Student’s t-distribution, presents very similar results, suggesting statistically significant 
positive abnormal returns around the Schedule 13D announcement date. 
These findings are in line with those of previous studies on U.S. hedge fund activism which, 
however, were obtained on the basis of either shorter or relatively earlier period. For instance, 
the results of Brav et al. (2008a) and Brav et al. (2008b) cover the period 2001-2006, whilst 
 15 
Becht et al. (2017), Bebchuk et al. (2015), Klein and Zur (2008), and Clifford (2008) 
considered the periods 2000-2010, 1994-2007, 2003-2005, and 1998-2005, respectively. As, 
according to Klein and Zur (2009), results may differ across samples, the current results, for a 
period up to 2013 and including events which occurred within the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
can be interpreted as extending the earlier results for a recent period which encompasses the 
turbulent span of a major financial crisis.  
 
4.2. Abnormal returns around voice 
The results from testing the null hypothesis (5), namely that the stock market does not 
respond to voice announcements, are reported in Tables 2a (for the market model and the 
Carhart model) and 2b (for the GARCH-in-Mean model). The message from these Tables is 
as follows. Statistically significant, in most cases at the 1% level, abnormal returns exist over 
the period (0, +4), and on date -9, regardless of the abnormal returns model and the test 
statistic employed. The abnormal returns are positive, and are approximately 1.11%. 
Importantly, compared to the abnormal returns around the Schedule 13D, the voice abnormal 
returns are higher by approximately 64%. Thus, voicing yields short-term value creation19. 
 
As voicing involves information disclosure about the objectives of the hedge fund activists, it 
is also related to the literature on mandatory disclosure of information in financial markets 
which is at the forefront of regulatory efforts to improve market quality. There is an ongoing 
discussion about the limits and costs of mandatory disclosure as well as about the challenges 
faced by policymakers with regard to mandatory disclosure (Enriques and Gilotta, 2015). 
Several studies have found that information disclosure, in general, creates value to 
shareholders (Akhigbe and Martin, 2006). Our findings are in line with such findings. 
However, our findings go further in suggesting that the two-step mechanism of disclosure of 
hedge fund activism (disclosure at Schedule 13D and disclosure at voice, at two 
chronologically different dates) may create anticipation by stock market participants of 
arbitrage profits. Although some benefits of disclosure do exist (like shareholder value 
creation), much has been written about potential unintended consequences of disclosure 
leading authors to search for an optimal level of disclosure in terms of promoting market 
                                               
19 As our objective is to illustrate the role of voicing in short-term value creation, exploring the long-
term effects of voicing is not in the scope of this paper. Long-term effects of hedge fund activism 
around the Schedule 13D announcement have been explored in the literature with rather conflicting 
results. Cremers et al. (2015) contends that long-term effects may be endogenous and value increases 
might be attributable to market mechanisms other than hedge fund activism, whilst Bebchuk et al. 
(2015) suggest that positive long-term value effects exist which are in line with the identified short-
term effects.   
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quality. Goldstein and Yang (2017) argued that one form of disclosure regulation is when 
investors are required to disclose information about their holdings in firms that might pertain 
to activism or intentions of activism, which is exactly the case of voicing examined here. Our 
results point at two chronologically different but linked (through mandatory regulation) event 
dates of hedge fund activism, which creates stock market inefficiencies and arbitrage and 
reduces instead of improving market quality.  
 
These results show that the news disclosed at voice entails information revelation which is 
reflected into the stock market by a positive response. According to Suominen (2001), 
information revelation has empirical implications related to conditional volatility (i.e. 
GARCH-type), which justifies the adoption of the GARCH-in-Mean model for abnormal 
returns20. Furthermore, as the average voice date comes chronologically after the average 
Schedule 13D announcement date, the anticipation by market participants of subsequent 
voicing, created by the Schedule 13D announcement, can result in arbitrage due to the 
positive abnormal returns around voicing identified in our results.  This point is related to the 
contention that there are many aspects to consider when evaluating the effects of information 
disclosure and the optimal regulation of the level and form of disclosure (Goldstein and Yang 
(2017, p. 122)).  
 
4.3. Difference between abnormal returns of Schedule 13D and voice 
We next turn to testing the hypotheses in (10)-(12), namely that the market reacts differently 
to the Schedule 13D and voice events. The results are reported in Tables 3a (market and 
Carhart models) and 3b (GARCH-in-Mean). The Tables report the test results of the 
difference between the average standardized abnormal returns of the voice and the average 
standardized abnormal returns of the Schedule 13D filing dates. In hypotheses (10)-(12), Vt
denotes the average standardized abnormal returns of the voice, while St  denotes the average 
abnormal returns of the Schedule 13D filings dates. We report the p-value of the t-statistic 
when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH  (Hypothesis in (10)). In those Tables, “p-
val right” denotes the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is 
0:1  StVtH  (Hypothesis in (11)) and “p-val left” denotes the p-value of the t-statistic 
when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH   (Hypothesis in (12)).  
 
The results suggest that, based on the “p-val”, the difference of the abnormal returns is 
statistically significant over the period (+1, +3) under all 3 models of abnormal returns. Based 
                                               
20 Based on this contention, we will address the additional aspect of asymmetric conditional volatility 
using EGARCH and GARCH-GJR models in the following section for robustness.  
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on the “p-val right”, the statistically significant difference reveals that the abnormal returns of 
voice are significantly higher than the returns of Schedule 13D21. These results indicate that 
the announcement made and information disclosed at the Schedule 13D does not reveal the 
full but only partial information, with the remainder of information being revealed at voice.  
 
Our previous finding that the abnormal returns of voice are significantly higher than the 
returns of Schedule 13D is supported by the heteroscedasticity-robust tests of Yuen (1974), 
and Guo and Luh (2000). As shown in Tables 3c (for the market model), 3d (for the Carhart 
model), and 3e (for the GARCH-in-Mean model), both the Yuen (1974) and the Guo and Luh 
(2000) tests indicate that the abnormal returns of voice are different from the Schedule 13D 
returns (based on the p-val); moreover, the former are higher that the latter (based on the p-val 
right).  The information disclosed at voice does reveal further news which is important and 
reflected in the market, supporting the conjecture that voice is related to information 
revelation in the U.S. stock market. Finally, this statistically significant difference between 
the voice and the Schedule 13D abnormal returns is approximately 0.4%, and is interpreted as 
an average arbitrage profit that can be obtained between the two dates.  
 
These findings are in line with the dynamic trading models of Kyle (1985) and Ostrovsky 
(2012). Information revelation occurs when an informed trader, through his actions, takes 
advantage of his information and eventually moves the price of the stock to its correct value 
(Ostrovsky (2012)). In Kyle’s (1985) dynamic trading model, the informational content of 
prices is examined along with the value of information to an informed trader, and price 
innovations are modelled as a consequence of information revelation with the informed trader 
acting in such a way so that his information is incorporated into prices. In our framework, the 
informed trader is the hedge fund and his actions include the hedge fund activism and 
information disclosure at both the Schedule 13D and the voice date. Our results are an 
empirical manifestation of Kyle’s findings, in which hedge fund (informed trader) through 
hedge fund activism information revelation actions moves the security price to a new level. 
 
4.4 Abnormal returns of voice when voicing leads Schedule 13D filings 
As our sample records both the voice and the Schedule 13D dates, we identify 93 voice events 
which chronologically took place prior to the Schedule 13D filing date by 10 trading days or 
                                               
21 Based on the “p-val left”, the Schedule 13D returns are higher than the voice returns over the period 
(-9,-7). This is consistent with the fact that filers have a 10-day window to file their beneficial 
ownership, and with hedge funds building their beneficial ownership stake gradually before the 
Schedule 13D filing. 
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less. The voice abnormal returns over the period (-20, +20) for the events are calculated using 
the 3 models, and results are reported in Table 3f. Based on inference from both the 
parametric and the non-parametric Wilcoxon tests, the results show that, at the 5% level, there 
exist statistically significant abnormal returns 1 trading day prior to the voicing date (-1), 
under all 3 models. These returns are positive, in line with the previously documented results 
in Tables 2a and 2b. The main message which emerges is that voicing on its own creates 
short-term value, and not necessarily as a result of the Schedule 13D filing. Markets respond 
to hedge fund voicing, regardless of whether this occurs prior to or after the Schedule 13D, 
which signals significant voice-related information revelation.  
 
4.5. Abnormal returns of non-voice, and testing the difference between voice and non-voice 
As hedge funds aim to change the strategy, the management, or the governance of a target 
company, they may get in conflict with the managers or the dominant shareholders who 
control the target company (Pacces (2016)). The choice between voicing and non-voicing (i.e. 
exiting the target firm) can be the outcome of this conflict as a rational decision by the hedge 
fund activist. This decision is dependent on whether the hedge fund can influence the target, 
whether the hedge fund needs to influence the target, or whether the expected gain of 
influencing the target exceeds the cost. Parameters which affect this choice include the extent  
to which the target firm already operates at maximum performance, and the degree to which 
other investors in the target firm are dissatisfied with the management (Admati and Pfleidere 
(2009); Kedia et al. (2017)).  
 
The results from testing the null hypothesis in (6), regarding the abnormal returns of non-
voicing, are reported in Tables 4a (market model and the Carhart model) and 4b (GARCH-in-
Mean). The results indicate that non-voice is also related to positive abnormal returns over the 
period (-1, +1). These results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 1a and 1b 
for the full sample of Schedule 13D announcements. Positive abnormal returns for non-voice 
could be interpreted as suggesting that the hedge fund activist, after monitoring the firm’s 
operations, realizes that there is no scope of improving action. As contended by Brav et al. 
(2008b, p. 1748), some hedge fund activists hope to facilitate value enhancing changes in the 
target company as minority shareholders without taking control of the target firm’s board of 
directors. Non-voicing may signal to the stock market that the target firm’s value is already 
high enough so no value enhancing changes can be made. This can be the case when the 
target firm is already at an optimum level in terms of operations, strategy, etc, and the hedge 
fund activist has nothing more to offer (hence the non-voice) and exits the minority stake.  
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The positive abnormal returns may also be attributed to a relatively small degree of 
dissatisfaction of other institutional investors in the target firm (Kedia et al. (2017)). The fact 
that the existing management is strong and in close agreement regarding its vision about the 
future of the firm. So, the hedge fund’s exiting from the target firm (non-voicing) is perceived 
by the market as good news about the target firm’s condition or its management.  
 
Another justification of the positive abnormal returns of non-voice (exit) is provided by 
Admati and Pfleiderer (2009). Over the period from the date of the Schedule 13D to the date 
of exit, the threat of exit can be a form of activism (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)). Palmiter 
(2002, pp. 1437–38) suggests that large shareholders may be able to affect managerial 
decisions through the “threat (actual or implied) of selling their holdings and driving down 
the price of the targeted company”. If managers’ compensation is linked to share prices, and if 
the exit of a large shareholder has a negative price impact, then the presence of a large 
shareholder, who is potentially able to trade on private information, may help discipline the 
management and improve corporate governance (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)). So, exiting 
may imply that, through the threat of exit, the objective of improving corporate performance 
has been accomplished. 
 
Combining the results on positive abnormal returns for voice and non-voice suggests that 
stock market participants can obtain positive abnormal returns in any state of nature following 
the  Schedule 13D announcement, namely regardless of whether the hedge fund is eventually 
engaged to the target (voice) or exits (non-voice). This further indicates that the disclosure of 
information at the Schedule 13D announcement creates anticipation to market participants 
that, regardless of the eventual voice-exit decision, arbitrage profits (abnormal returns) are to 
be generated sometime during the course of the hedge fund’s holding of the minority stake.  
In other words, information revelation occurs at either the voice or the exit decision.  
 
We next turn to testing the null hypotheses reflected in (13)-(15), namely that the previously 
identified abnormal returns for voice and non-voice are different (Hypothesis (13)). If we find 
that they are, we can test whether the voice returns are higher than the non-voice returns 
(Hypothesis (14)), or the opposite (Hypothesis (15)). The results are reported in Tables 5a (for 
the market and the Carhart models) and 5b (for the GARCH-in-Mean model). In line with 
Table 3a, these Tables report the test results of the difference between the average 
standardized abnormal returns of the voice and the average standardized abnormal returns of 
the non-voice.  Denoting by Vt  the average standardized abnormal returns of the voice and 
with NVt  the average abnormal returns of the non-voice, Tables 5a and 5b report the p-value 
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of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is (“p-val”) 0:1  NVtVtH  . In addition, 
they report the “p-val right” denoting the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative 
hypothesis is 0:1  NVtVtH  , and the “p-val left” denoting the p-value of the t-statistic 
when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  NVtVtH  . 
 
The results from these Tables suggest that the voice abnormal returns are different from the 
non-voice returns over the period (0, +3) at the 5% or 1% level, regardless of the abnormal 
returns model. Thus, Hypothesis (13) is rejected in favour of its alternative. Moving on to 
identifying which abnormal returns are higher, the “p-val right” indicates that the difference 
between the voice returns and the non-voice returns is strongly significant over the period (0, 
+3). Thus, we conclude that the voice average abnormal returns are higher than the non-voice 
average abnormal returns at the 1% level at or post the event22. These findings suggest that 
the announcement at voice reveals more influential information than the non-voice 
announcement does. Stock markets respond more aggressively to voice than to Schedule 13D, 
signalling richer information revelation at voice events. 
 
4.6. Basic implications, and regulatory policy recommendation 
As discussed above, there is an ongoing debate on the limits and costs of the regulation of 
mandatory disclosure in stock markets, and whether this regulation has net positive or 
negative effects on stock market quality (Enriques and Gilotta, (2015)), Greenstone et al. 
(2006)). As a consequence, policy makers face the challenge of searching for an optimal level 
of disclosure in terms of promoting market quality (Goldstein and Yang (2017)). Our results 
have implications for regulation specifically related to mandatory disclosure of hedge fund 
activism events, and for policy making. The voice date and the Schedule 13D date, which in 
general do not coincide, are two important hallmarks of mandatory disclosure in regulation 
for the hedge fund activism. We find that both dates, and not only the Schedule 13D date, are 
important in short-term value creation. In addition, disclosure of non-voice is also related to 
value creation. All of these cases of value creation involve positive abnormal returns around 
the corresponding event dates. The positive abnormal returns at Schedule 13D events, voice 
events, and non-voice events, in conjunction with the fact that these events are disclosed at 
different dates, indicate opportunities for arbitrage. Arbitrage is detrimental for the U.S. stock 
market quality. However, in principle, mandatory disclosure regulation should aim at 
improving, not decreasing, stock market quality. Therefore, based on the criterion of 
                                               
22 For the period (-10, -7), there is evidence that the non-voice returns are higher than the voice 
returns. This is consistent with the fact that filers have a 10-day window to file their beneficial 
ownership, and they build their beneficial ownership before the Schedule 13D filing release.  
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promoting stock market quality, our findings point to the need of revisiting the way that 
hedge fund activism related information is disclosed in the stock market. This need is also in 
line with legal scholars' recommendations for significant modification of U.S. securities 
markets regulation (Mahoney, (1997), Romano (1998), Palmiter (1999)).  
 
One way of restructuring the mechanism of mandatory disclosure of information for hedge 
fund activism events is the introduction of gradual disclosure of information on hedge fund 
activism. Under such an arrangement, regulators would require hedge fund activists to file 
several 'progress reports' or 'preliminary intention reports' at fixed time intervals until their 
final decision to voice or non-voice. In these reports, they will update market participants on 
their intention to engage into or exit from the target firm. In this way, instead of the full 
voice/non-voice information reaching the market at only one day (i.e. the event day), gradual 
dissemination of information may reduce the positive abnormal returns around the voice and 
non-voice dates, limit arbitrage opportunities, and thus improve market quality. Gradual 
dissemination means that market participants would act on several dates (the dates 
corresponding to the disclosure of the various ‘preliminary intention reports’) and not 
necessarily only on the one date corresponding to the one-off event disclosure (Schedule 13D 
date or voice date or non-voice date). This would reduce the number of market participants 
acting only on the event date and thus, reduce the amount of abnormal returns on that date. In 
addition, within the framework of Kyle (1985), gradual dissemination means that the single 
informed trader (hedge fund activist) would, due to gradual information revelation, have less 
power to drive through his one-off action (e.g. disclosure of voice or non-voice) the price to a 
new level. Importantly, this regulatory policy recommendation is in line with the research 
design of the Securities Act Amendments of 1964 which points to 'gradual dissemination of 
news' by firms filing with the SEC (Greenstone et al., (2006), page 415).  
 
5. Robustness 
5.1. Asymmetric (leverage) volatility effects and GARCH models for abnormal returns 
Suominen (2001) has shown that information revelation in stock markets suggests that the 
expected price variability looks similar to a conditional variance GARCH-type model. In this 
section, we add another aspect of modeling time-varying volatility, namely allowing for 
asymmetric or leverage effects in the GARCH model, namely for the fact that negative shocks 
have a greater impact on stock return volatility than positive shocks. The most well-known 
GARCH-type models incorporating asymmetric effects are the exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) (Nelson, 1991) and the GARCH-GJR (Glosten et al. 1993). 
 
Under the EGARCH representation of the conditional variable, the expected returns evolve as 
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, k are the degrees of freedom, Γ(.) is the 
Gamma function, and  ith  is the sequence of conditional variances which evolve as an 
EGARCH(1,1) process. Thus, abnormal returns are calculated based on the EGARCH-in-
Mean model reflected in (24)-(26). The constant 0k  and the coefficients ,3,2,1, ii are 
estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood method.  
 
Under the GARCH-GJR model, the following representation is considered: 
  ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR                 (27) 
  ,2/1ititit hu                                                                                                                 (28) 
  ,0 2 11312
2
110   ititititit uuIhukh                                                                (29) 
where  it  is a sequence of random variables which are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed as Student’s t with unknown degrees of freedom,  01 ituI  is an 
indicator function that assigns the value 1 when 0itu and 0 otherwise, and  ith  is the 
sequence of conditional variances. Thus, abnormal returns are calculated based on the GJR-
GARCH-in-Mean model reflected in (27)-(29). All models are estimated using the quasi-
maximum likelihood method.  
 
The empirical results are reported in Table 6 for the Schedule 13D abnormal returns, Table 7 
for the voice abnormal returns and Table 8 for the non-voice abnormal returns. Each Table 
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reports both the parametric and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test p-values. As 
shown in Table 6, the Schedule 13D abnormal returns, based on the EGARCH-in-Mean and 
the GJR-GARCH-in-Mean models with the Student’s t-distribution, are statistically 
significant for the periods (-1, +1) at the 1% level of significance. These findings are exactly 
the same as those reported in Tables 1a and 1b for the market model, the Carhart model, and 
the simple GARCH-in-Mean model. Thus, the results on the significance of the Schedule 13D 
abnormal returns are robust to asymmetric conditional variance effects23.  
 
Similar results are obtained from Table 7 for the voice abnormal returns. Under both the 
EGARCH-in-Mean and the GJR-GARCH-in-Mean models, the voice abnormal returns are 
different from 0 and positive over the period (0, +4) at either the 5% or the 1% level, based on 
both the parametric and the non-parametric tests. These findings are very similar to those 
under the previously examined three models in Tables 2a and 2b. Finally, Table 8, for the 
non-voice abnormal returns, indicates that these returns are different from 0 over the period (-
1, +1) under both models based on the parametric test24. 
 
The main message from these robustness checks is as follows: Volatility clustering is the 
main empirical implication of information revelation (Suominen (2001)). This clustering may 
carry (especially in stock returns) an additional empirical characteristic, namely asymmetry 
(or leverage effects) (Nelson (1991); Glosten et al. (1993)). We illustrate that results on the 
statistical significance of abnormal returns around primarily the voice events (as well as 
around the Schedule 13D and non-voice events) are robust to both volatility clustering and 
leverage effects.  
 
Finally, based on the EGARCH-in-Mean and GJR-GARCH-in-Mean models, we proceed to 
testing the difference between the Schedule 13D abnormal returns and voice returns, and the 
difference between the voice abnormal returns and the non-voice returns. The results are 
reported in Table 9 for the former tests and Table 10 for the latter tests. In line with Table 3a, 
we report the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH  , the 
“p-val right” which denotes the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is
0:1  StVtH  , and the “p-val left” which denotes the p-value of the t-statistic when the 
alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH  . As shown in the “p-val right” column of Table 9, the 
                                               
23 The parametric test also indicates significance over the period (-9, +5) whilst the non-parametric test 
shows only limited evidence of significance over parts of the former period. 
24 Using the non-parametric Wilcoxon test, the abnormal returns are significant only on day -1.  
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voice abnormal returns are higher than the Schedule 13D abnormal returns over the period 
(+1, +3) at the 1% or 5% level25.  
 
Turning to the difference between voice and non-voice abnormal returns, Table 10 shows that 
over the period (0, +4) the voice returns are higher than the non-voice returns26. These 
findings are in line with those under the market model, the Carhart model, and the simple 
GARCH-in-Mean model, and suggest that our results are robust to models of abnormal 
returns allowing for richer empirical characteristics in the time-varying volatility process. 
 
5.2. Further evidence from alternative non-parametric statistical procedures 
To assess the robustness of our results to alternative inferential statistical procedures, we 
employ the rank test procedure of Corrado (1989), and Corrado and Zivney (1992). This is a 
non-parametric procedure which is based on the transformation of all the combined 
estimation window and event period abnormal returns into their respective ranks.  The test 
statistic is defined as 
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, iW is the number of non-missing returns of both estimation and 
event window for stock i, and N is the number of non-missing returns across stocks. The 
standard deviation is defined as 
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where L is the length of both estimation and event windows, 0T  is the first day of the 
estimation window, and 
2T  is the last day of the event window. Under the null hypothesis 
that the average abnormal returns at event day t are equal to zero, the test statistic tRt ,  is 
distributed as standard normal. A fixed length estimation window is used to calculate the 
abnormal returns and the Corrado rank statistics at each event day. Estimation windows of 
                                               
25 As indicated in the “p-val left” column, the Schedule 13D abnormal returns are higher than the 
voice returns over the period (-9, -7). This is in line with the results in Table 3a, and is consistent with 
the fact that filers have a 10-day window to file their beneficial ownership and build their beneficial 
ownership to the target company before the Schedule 13D filing release.  
26 In line with the previously reported results in Tables 5a and 5b, over the period (-10, -7), non-voice 
abnormal returns are higher than voice abnormal returns.  
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length equal to 198, 212, and 212 observations are selected for the voice, the Schedule 13D, 
and the non-voice event-based stocks, respectively.     
 
The results are reported in Tables 11, 12, and 13, for the Schedule 13D, voice and non-voice 
abnormal returns respectively. These Tables show that voicing is associated with statistically 
significant at the 5% abnormal returns over the period (-2, +5) irrespective of the abnormal 
returns model employed. In contrast, for Schedule 13D events, there is limited evidence of 
abnormal returns at the 10% level at best, and under only the GARCH, EGARCH and GJR-
GARCH models. For the non-voice events, there is even scarcer evidence of abnormal returns 
only under the GARCH model and at the 10% level. These results signal that the voice events 
carry richer news compared to the other two types of events, and yield richer information 
revelation to which stock market participants are more highly respondent.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper emphasizes the role of voicing in hedge fund activism. We construct a hand-
collected large data set of 205 U.S. hedge funds and 1031 activist events over the period 
2005-2013, and record both the Schedule 13D filing date and the voice date. We reveal that 
the voice date is important in creating short-term firm value, and provide strong evidence that 
voicing in hedge fund activism is associated with positive abnormal returns. The abnormal 
returns around the voicing date are approximately 1.11%, and are higher than the abnormal 
returns around the Schedule13D date by approximately 64%. In addition, positive abnormal 
returns due to voicing are found even when voicing leads the Schedule 13D event. Therefore, 
voicing on its own creates short-term value, and not necessarily as a result of the Schedule 
13D filing. Markets respond to hedge fund voicing, regardless of whether this occurs prior to 
or after the Schedule 13D, which signals significant information revelation. The results are 
robust to alternative models of abnormal returns and inferential statistical procedures. 
These findings are interpreted as evidence that the U.S. stock market response to Schedule 
13D events is smaller than that to voice events. Furthermore, the disclosures at the voice date 
and Schedule 13D date create information revelation and may form a mechanism for 
arbitrage. The latter point highlights the need for a closer look at hedge fund activism 
disclosure regulation in the U.S. stock market, in order to achieve the primary goal of 
mandatory regulation which is stock market quality improvement.  
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Figure 1: Average abnormal returns of Schedule 13D filings 
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Figure 2: Average abnormal returns of voice 
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Figure 3: Average abnormal returns of non-voice 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the stock returns (in %) 
 All Schedule 13D voice non-voice 
  (-20, 0T ) ( 0T ,0) ( 0T ,20) (-20, 0T ) ( 0T ,0) ( 0T ,20) (-20, 0T ) ( 0T ,0) ( 0T ,20) 
Mean 0.041 0.049 0.056 0.057 0.030 0.033 0.037 0.060 0.069 0.069 
Median 0.000 -0.018 -0.016 -0.014 -0.032 -0.029 -0.029 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
2.623 3.129 3.177 3.175 3.058 3.087 3.097 3.199 3.259 3.249 
Kurtosis 62.651 17.690 20.680 21.135 15.889 16.571 17.233 19.398 24.431 24.779 
Skewness 1.985 0.661 0.870 0.901 0.465 0.479 0.544 0.807 1.183 1.194 
Minimum -24.713 -19.775 -20.038 -20.172 -20.038 -20.584 -20.757 -19.853 -20.014 -20.085 
Maximum 38.477 24.036 26.468 26.871 22.043 22.904 23.627 25.647 29.167 29.320 
Number 
of stocks 
 
1025 770 283  487  
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of all stock returns and for the stock returns that comprise each 
event-based category. Stock returns are computed as the logarithmic first differences of the corresponding stocks, 
multiplied by 100. The summary statistics for each event-based category are calculated by using three different 
sample windows; the first covers the period from the first available observation to twenty trading days before the 
event day, (-20, 0T ); the second from the first available observation to the event day, ( 0T , 0); and the third from 
the first available observation to twenty trading days after the event day, ( 0T , 20). 0T represents the first day of 
the estimation sample window. -20 denote 20 trading days before the event day; 0 denotes the event day; 20 
denotes 20 trading days after the event day.      
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Table 1a: Abnormal returns of Schedule 13D filings 
Models   Market model   Carhart model % of 
+ARs Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
  AR p-val p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.401 0.056* 0.297   0.395 0.061* 0.261 45.325 
-19   0.353 0.176 0.021**   0.349 0.180 0.025** 44.805 
-18   0.389 0.260 0.003***   0.415 0.231 0.012** 43.117 
-17   0.136 0.362 0.249   0.150 0.313 0.482 45.325 
-16   -0.021 0.887 0.072*   -0.018 0.901 0.145 45.455 
-15   -0.006 0.969 0.307   -0.019 0.907 0.274 46.883 
-14   0.547 0.000*** 0.291   0.554 0.000*** 0.174 48.182 
-13   0.207 0.367 0.002***   0.171 0.458 0.001*** 43.506 
-12   0.095 0.479 0.670   0.091 0.493 0.752 48.442 
-11   0.075 0.682 0.020**   0.055 0.758 0.062* 44.416 
-10   0.258 0.310 0.008***   0.304 0.232 0.026** 43.636 
-9   0.655 0.013** 0.435   0.651 0.013** 0.670 47.013 
-8   0.639 0.009*** 0.478   0.659 0.007*** 0.255 49.091 
-7   0.587 0.040** 0.745   0.611 0.031** 0.951 47.532 
-6   0.559 0.001*** 0.009***   0.517 0.003*** 0.041** 52.727 
-5   0.442 0.003*** 0.024**   0.401 0.006*** 0.147 51.299 
-4   0.150 0.209 0.414   0.113 0.343 0.748 51.169 
-3   0.463 0.125 0.557   0.441 0.145 0.700 50.260 
-2   0.025 0.897 0.279   0.017 0.931 0.321 45.714 
-1   0.445 0.001*** 0.004***   0.452 0.001*** 0.003*** 52.078 
0   0.788 0.000*** 0.000***   0.867 0.000*** 0.000*** 53.117 
1   0.661 0.000*** 0.000***   0.657 0.000*** 0.000*** 52.857 
2   0.125 0.308 0.275   0.123 0.321 0.402 42.857 
3   0.037 0.748 0.256   0.014 0.898 0.163 45.195 
4   0.195 0.127 0.654   0.157 0.205 0.424 46.364 
5   0.177 0.148 0.417   0.111 0.361 0.846 49.221 
6   0.306 0.142 0.414   0.297 0.150 0.428 46.104 
7   0.085 0.636 0.050*   0.120 0.501 0.294 44.156 
8   -0.022 0.878 0.149   -0.052 0.713 0.216 46.234 
9   0.351 0.119 0.122   0.368 0.101 0.109 52.078 
10   0.002 0.988 0.523   0.027 0.831 0.615 47.273 
11   0.120 0.426 0.033**   0.101 0.496 0.048** 44.675 
12   0.070 0.675 0.169   0.082 0.626 0.171 46.883 
13   0.135 0.363 0.600   0.132 0.379 0.732 49.221 
14   -0.132 0.318 0.048**   -0.132 0.323 0.049** 45.584 
15   0.149 0.231 0.755   0.162 0.191 0.633 47.532 
16   0.283 0.041** 0.466   0.265 0.053* 0.652 45.844 
17   -0.059 0.587 0.107   -0.056 0.609 0.139 46.234 
18   -0.129 0.330 0.081*   -0.086 0.511 0.369 46.364 
19   0.036 0.752 0.039**   0.009 0.938 0.056* 43.636 
20   0.067 0.584 0.477   0.034 0.783 0.350 47.013 
Notes: This table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the Schedule 13D filing date. Two 
models are used to compute the abnormal returns, namely the market model, and the Carhart model. We also 
report the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric 
test (denoted as “p-val”), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Last column presents the percentage of 
the positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates 
statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 1b: Abnormal returns of Schedule 13D filings 
Models   GARCH-in-Mean with 
normal distribution 
   GARCH-in-Mean with 
Student’s t distribution 
% of 
+ARs 
Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.408 0.049** 0.263   0.407 0.050** 0.242 47.402 
-19   0.383 0.146 0.033**   0.379 0.151 0.034** 44.026 
-18   0.450 0.192 0.028**   0.443 0.199 0.022** 43.506 
-17   0.161 0.285 0.473   0.152 0.313 0.469 46.883 
-16   -0.005 0.975 0.186   -0.015 0.920 0.165 45.324 
-15   -0.005 0.975 0.260   -0.015 0.925 0.231 46.363 
-14   0.570 0.000*** 0.124   0.560 0.000*** 0.151 49.220 
-13   0.185 0.427 0.001***   0.174 0.454 0.001*** 44.935 
-12   0.111 0.406 0.611   0.101 0.447 0.685 49.870 
-11   0.074 0.682 0.093*   0.062 0.731 0.070* 46.103 
-10   0.326 0.208 0.038**   0.313 0.227 0.025** 44.545 
-9   0.699 0.011** 0.719   0.691 0.012** 0.678 46.623 
-8   0.719 0.004*** 0.156   0.714 0.004*** 0.178 50.779 
-7   0.665 0.019** 0.751   0.664 0.020** 0.797 48.831 
-6   0.565 0.001*** 0.028**   0.557 0.001*** 0.034** 53.376 
-5   0.448 0.003*** 0.077*   0.437 0.004*** 0.098* 50.259 
-4   0.158 0.197 0.495   0.149 0.225 0.605 50.649 
-3   0.480 0.114 0.548   0.470 0.121 0.582 50.389 
-2   0.045 0.819 0.506   0.045 0.817 0.505 47.402 
-1   0.481 0.000*** 0.001***   0.478 0.000*** 0.002*** 52.467 
0   0.895 0.000*** 0.000***   0.890 0.000*** 0.000*** 53.376 
1   0.692 0.000*** 0.000***   0.687 0.000*** 0.000*** 53.116 
2   0.156 0.218 0.537   0.150 0.234 0.481 44.545 
3   0.048 0.671 0.304   0.041 0.716 0.239 45.584 
4   0.191 0.132 0.591   0.185 0.144 0.518 47.013 
5   0.143 0.245 0.668   0.136 0.270 0.787 49.480 
6   0.328 0.113 0.705   0.321 0.121 0.630 46.883 
7   0.148 0.417 0.307   0.145 0.421 0.302 47.272 
8   -0.025 0.862 0.253   -0.026 0.854 0.226 46.233 
9   0.399 0.079* 0.097*   0.402 0.075* 0.100 52.207 
10   0.057 0.647 0.850   0.060 0.628 0.911 48.181 
11   0.128 0.395 0.091*   0.128 0.389 0.106 46.103 
12   0.109 0.516 0.322   0.107 0.521 0.327 47.662 
13   0.157 0.302 0.892   0.153 0.315 0.880 49.740 
14   -0.104 0.449 0.087*   -0.110 0.428 0.077* 45.324 
15   0.192 0.124 0.855   0.189 0.131 0.799 46.493 
16   0.292 0.033** 0.801   0.289 0.035** 0.818 47.792 
17   -0.029 0.790 0.218   -0.031 0.773 0.218 47.402 
18   -0.061 0.640 0.531   -0.064 0.623 0.563 48.311 
19   0.034 0.764 0.122   0.030 0.787 0.123 45.714 
20   0.059 0.637 0.606   0.059 0.636 0.648 47.402 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the Schedule 13D filing date. The 
abnormal returns are computed by using the model
  ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR  
 
where ith are the conditional variances. Two models are used to estimate the conditional variances, namely a 
GARCH(1,1) model based on normal distribution, and a GARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution 
with unknown degrees of freedom. We also report the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test (denoted as p-val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates 
statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical 
significance at level 1%. 
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Table 2a: Abnormal returns of voice  
Models   Market model   Carhart model % of 
+ARs Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   -0.004 0.985 0.565   0.008 0.973 0.551 46.996 
-19   -0.378 0.163 0.172   -0.414 0.126 0.104 45.583 
-18   0.787 0.367 0.267   0.815 0.350 0.475 46.290 
-17   0.010 0.964 0.432   0.051 0.807 0.896 46.643 
-16   0.036 0.837 0.705   0.010 0.954 0.655 48.410 
-15   -0.117 0.617 0.645   -0.077 0.744 0.945 44.876 
-14   -0.081 0.740 0.767   -0.109 0.659 0.992 50.883 
-13   -0.117 0.651 0.046**   -0.073 0.780 0.096* 43.816 
-12   -0.063 0.778 0.700   -0.091 0.683 0.602 46.290 
-11   -0.160 0.498 0.065*   -0.114 0.625 0.153 43.110 
-10   -0.132 0.543 0.396   -0.117 0.593 0.505 46.290 
-9   -0.452 0.036** 0.012**   -0.408 0.053* 0.041** 43.816 
-8   0.052 0.840 0.417   -0.019 0.941 0.238 46.290 
-7   -0.123 0.728 0.857   -0.101 0.773 0.912 48.763 
-6   0.440 0.219 0.434   0.463 0.195 0.209 51.590 
-5   0.175 0.539 0.776   0.165 0.559 0.994 50.530 
-4   -0.119 0.628 0.689   -0.110 0.649 0.825 50.530 
-3   -0.125 0.644 0.244   -0.067 0.804 0.109 52.650 
-2   0.004 0.991 0.892   0.006 0.987 0.545 46.996 
-1   0.468 0.110 0.031**   0.440 0.137 0.054* 54.417 
0   1.052 0.004*** 0.000***   1.067 0.003*** 0.000*** 59.364 
1   1.819 0.000*** 0.000***   1.827 0.000*** 0.000*** 60.071 
2   0.541 0.026** 0.293   0.542 0.024** 0.255 51.590 
3   0.572 0.023** 0.037**   0.530 0.031** 0.028** 51.590 
4   0.537 0.011** 0.014**   0.445 0.030** 0.048** 56.537 
5   0.261 0.357 0.731   0.217 0.440 0.958 50.530 
6   0.313 0.123 0.416   0.322 0.106 0.328 51.943 
7   0.378 0.160 0.978   0.353 0.184 0.914 48.763 
8   0.246 0.254 0.724   0.304 0.163 0.766 46.996 
9   0.332 0.339 0.329   0.293 0.402 0.471 52.297 
10   0.720 0.026** 0.175   0.720 0.025** 0.180 51.237 
11   0.195 0.369 0.923   0.157 0.442 0.840 46.996 
12   -0.017 0.931 0.950   -0.032 0.861 0.995 50.883 
13   -0.016 0.936 0.582   0.035 0.856 0.893 46.996 
14   0.089 0.599 0.479   0.098 0.558 0.725 43.110 
15   0.019 0.916 0.366   0.075 0.677 0.516 45.583 
16   0.207 0.394 0.490   0.231 0.333 0.797 47.703 
17   -0.051 0.763 0.561   -0.079 0.631 0.906 52.297 
18   0.441 0.098* 0.890   0.397 0.135 0.853 50.177 
19   0.096 0.685 0.075*   0.029 0.902 0.047** 42.049 
20   -0.168 0.500 0.733   -0.138 0.573 0.969 46.290 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the voice date. Two models are used to 
compute the abnormal returns, namely the market model, and the Carhart model. We also report the p-values on 
the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test (denoted as p-
val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the positive 
abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical 
significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 2b: Abnormal returns of voice  
Models   GARCH-in-Mean with 
normal distribution 
   GARCH-in-Mean with 
Student’s t distribution 
% of 
+ARs 
Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.006 0.981 0.534   0.012 0.958 0.555 46.996 
-19   -0.419 0.124 0.108   -0.412 0.129 0.122 44.876 
-18   0.810 0.353 0.429   0.814 0.351 0.454 46.643 
-17   0.010 0.964 0.643   0.016 0.941 0.682 46.643 
-16   -0.027 0.883 0.694   -0.023 0.899 0.690 50.883 
-15   -0.117 0.622 0.780   -0.112 0.637 0.803 46.996 
-14   -0.144 0.555 0.763   -0.144 0.553 0.749 49.470 
-13   -0.103 0.691 0.082*   -0.103 0.691 0.080* 45.583 
-12   -0.120 0.593 0.464   -0.122 0.586 0.447 47.703 
-11   -0.137 0.549 0.120   -0.138 0.549 0.126 45.583 
-10   -0.133 0.549 0.486   -0.130 0.556 0.512 47.703 
-9   -0.428 0.039** 0.026**   -0.421 0.043** 0.032** 44.170 
-8   -0.036 0.886 0.237   -0.031 0.903 0.244 47.703 
-7   -0.130 0.713 0.997   -0.124 0.724 0.902 50.177 
-6   0.444 0.212 0.221   0.454 0.201 0.195 52.650 
-5   0.140 0.619 0.914   0.142 0.612 0.943 48.763 
-4   -0.125 0.606 0.740   -0.124 0.611 0.759 50.883 
-3   -0.081 0.763 0.131   -0.082 0.762 0.120 56.184 
-2   -0.008 0.983 0.583   -0.007 0.984 0.597 50.177 
-1   0.424 0.148 0.061*   0.424 0.148 0.063* 53.004 
0   1.062 0.004*** 0.000***   1.065 0.004*** 0.000*** 61.131 
1   1.813 0.000*** 0.000***   1.818 0.000*** 0.000*** 56.537 
2   0.520 0.032** 0.297   0.526 0.031** 0.264 49.823 
3   0.511 0.040** 0.037**   0.522 0.036** 0.037** 52.297 
4   0.428 0.036** 0.054*   0.437 0.031** 0.051* 53.710 
5   0.200 0.477 0.900   0.207 0.462 0.973 48.763 
6   0.299 0.131 0.386   0.303 0.127 0.378 55.830 
7   0.336 0.205 0.994   0.343 0.193 0.969 50.883 
8   0.283 0.194 0.808   0.290 0.186 0.803 49.823 
9   0.274 0.443 0.564   0.279 0.437 0.554 49.823 
10   0.711 0.032** 0.201   0.718 0.031** 0.181 51.590 
11   0.158 0.458 0.867   0.167 0.436 0.821 48.057 
12   -0.034 0.853 0.909   -0.024 0.895 0.976 48.763 
13   0.033 0.861 0.820   0.045 0.813 0.891 48.410 
14   0.098 0.566 0.817   0.112 0.514 0.878 45.936 
15   0.078 0.665 0.609   0.092 0.614 0.674 46.643 
16   0.232 0.326 0.767   0.244 0.302 0.881 51.237 
17   -0.078 0.640 0.865   -0.061 0.713 0.713 50.530 
18   0.398 0.136 0.884   0.414 0.119 0.821 48.057 
19   0.035 0.884 0.048**   0.053 0.827 0.056* 40.989 
20   -0.126 0.597 0.913   -0.110 0.643 0.955 47.703 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the voice date. The abnormal returns 
are computed by using the model   ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR  
 
where ith are the conditional variances. Two models are used to estimate the conditional variances, namely a 
GARCH(1,1) model based on normal distribution, and a GARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution 
with unknown degrees of freedom. We also report the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test (denoted as p-val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates 
statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical 
significance at level 1%. 
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Table 3a: Testing for the difference between the standardized abnormal returns 
of Schedule 13D filings and voice  
Models   Market Model   Carhart Model  
Event 
Day 
  t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
-20   -1.102 0.271 0.864 0.136  -1.087 0.277 0.861 0.139 
-19   -2.215 0.027** 0.987 0.013***  -2.334 0.020** 0.990 0.010** 
-18   0.406 0.685 0.342 0.658  0.379 0.705 0.352 0.648 
-17   -0.803 0.422 0.789 0.211  -0.747 0.455 0.772 0.228 
-16   0.311 0.756 0.378 0.622  0.152 0.879 0.439 0.561 
-15   -0.970 0.333 0.834 0.166  -0.729 0.466 0.767 0.233 
-14   -1.747 0.081* 0.959 0.041***  -1.753 0.080* 0.960 0.040** 
-13   -0.867 0.386 0.807 0.193  -0.647 0.518 0.741 0.259 
-12   -1.124 0.261 0.869 0.131  -0.985 0.325 0.837 0.163 
-11   -0.588 0.557 0.722 0.278  -0.367 0.714 0.643 0.357 
-10   -1.185 0.236 0.882 0.118  -1.231 0.219 0.891 0.109 
-9   -3.467 0.001*** 1.000 0.000***  -3.359 0.001*** 1.000 0.000*** 
-8   -1.654 0.098* 0.951 0.049**  -1.914 0.056* 0.972 0.028** 
-7   -1.466 0.143 0.928 0.072*  -1.517 0.130 0.935 0.065* 
-6   -0.706 0.481 0.760 0.240  -0.448 0.654 0.673 0.327 
-5   -0.531 0.595 0.702 0.298  -0.393 0.695 0.653 0.347 
-4   -1.206 0.229 0.886 0.114  -1.033 0.302 0.849 0.151 
-3   -0.854 0.394 0.803 0.197  -0.631 0.529 0.736 0.264 
-2   -0.782 0.435 0.783 0.217  -0.805 0.421 0.789 0.211 
-1   0.246 0.806 0.403 0.597  0.141 0.888 0.444 0.556 
0   1.597 0.111 0.056* 0.944  1.419 0.157 0.078* 0.922 
1   3.230 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.999  3.195 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.999 
2   1.848 0.065* 0.033** 0.967  1.912 0.057* 0.028** 0.972 
3   2.491 0.013** 0.007*** 0.993  2.579 0.010** 0.005*** 0.995 
4   0.967 0.334 0.167 0.833  0.615 0.539 0.269 0.731 
5   0.062 0.950 0.475 0.525  -0.012 0.990 0.505 0.495 
6   0.060 0.952 0.476 0.524  0.041 0.967 0.484 0.516 
7   0.854 0.394 0.197 0.803  0.602 0.547 0.274 0.726 
8   0.959 0.338 0.169 0.831  1.413 0.158 0.079* 0.921 
9   0.917 0.360 0.180 0.820  0.759 0.448 0.224 0.776 
10   1.642 0.102 0.051* 0.949  1.606 0.109 0.055* 0.945 
11   1.291 0.197 0.099* 0.901  1.247 0.213 0.106 0.894 
12   0.159 0.873 0.437 0.563  0.123 0.902 0.451 0.549 
13   -0.926 0.355 0.823 0.177  -0.723 0.470 0.765 0.235 
14   0.703 0.483 0.241 0.759  0.784 0.433 0.217 0.783 
15   -1.254 0.210 0.895 0.105  -1.213 0.226 0.887 0.113 
16   -0.375 0.708 0.646 0.354  -0.154 0.878 0.561 0.439 
17   0.600 0.549 0.275 0.725  0.458 0.647 0.324 0.676 
18   1.804 0.072* 0.036** 0.964  1.469 0.143 0.071* 0.929 
19   0.198 0.843 0.422 0.578  0.036 0.971 0.486 0.514 
20   -1.575 0.116 0.942 0.058*  -1.353 0.177 0.912 0.088* 
Notes: the table reports the test results of the difference between the average standardized abnormal returns of 
voice and the average standardized abnormal returns of the Schedule 13D filings. Vt denotes the average 
standardized abnormal returns of the voice, while St denotes the average abnormal returns of the Schedule 13D 
filings dates. We report the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH   . “p-val 
right” denotes the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH  .  “p-val left” 
denotes the p-value of the t-statistic when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH  . * indicates statistical 
significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at 
level 1%. 
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Table 3b: Testing for the difference between the standardized abnormal returns 
of Schedule 13D filings and voice  
Models   GARCH-in-Mean with 
normal distribution 
   GARCH-in-Mean 
with Student’s t 
distribution 
 
Event 
Day 
  t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
  t-
test 
p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
-20   -1.106 0.269 0.865 0.135   -1.090 0.276 0.862 0.138 
-19   -2.408 0.016** 0.992 0.008***   -2.387 0.017** 0.991 0.009*** 
-18   0.313 0.755 0.377 0.623   0.328 0.743 0.372 0.628 
-17   -0.863 0.389 0.806 0.194   -0.811 0.418 0.791 0.209 
-16   0.014 0.988 0.494 0.506   0.075 0.940 0.470 0.530 
-15   -0.832 0.406 0.797 0.203   -0.785 0.433 0.783 0.217 
-14   -1.898 0.058* 0.971 0.029**   -1.877 0.061* 0.969 0.031** 
-13   -0.747 0.456 0.772 0.228   -0.720 0.472 0.764 0.236 
-12   -1.134 0.257 0.871 0.129   -1.112 0.267 0.867 0.133 
-11   -0.479 0.632 0.684 0.316   -0.442 0.659 0.671 0.329 
-10   -1.313 0.189 0.905 0.095*   -1.273 0.203 0.898 0.102 
-9   -3.512 0.000*** 1.000 0.000***   -3.464 0.001*** 1.000 0.000*** 
-8   -2.074 0.038** 0.981 0.019**   -2.047 0.041** 0.980 0.020** 
-7   -1.663 0.097* 0.952 0.048**   -1.647 0.100 0.950 0.050* 
-6   -0.617 0.537 0.731 0.269   -0.561 0.575 0.712 0.288 
-5   -0.580 0.562 0.719 0.281   -0.529 0.597 0.702 0.298 
-4   -1.220 0.223 0.888 0.112   -1.165 0.245 0.878 0.122 
-3   -0.765 0.444 0.778 0.222   -0.734 0.463 0.768 0.232 
-2   -0.884 0.377 0.811 0.189   -0.882 0.378 0.811 0.189 
-1   0.069 0.945 0.472 0.528   0.073 0.942 0.471 0.529 
0   1.319 0.188 0.094* 0.906   1.327 0.185 0.093* 0.907 
1   3.123 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.999   3.145 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.999 
2   1.681 0.093* 0.047** 0.953   1.704 0.089* 0.045** 0.955 
3   2.332 0.020** 0.010** 0.990   2.384 0.018** 0.009*** 0.991 
4   0.390 0.697 0.348 0.652   0.473 0.637 0.318 0.682 
5   -0.191 0.849 0.576 0.424   -0.123 0.902 0.549 0.451 
6   -0.145 0.885 0.558 0.442   -0.075 0.940 0.530 0.470 
7   0.463 0.644 0.322 0.678   0.522 0.602 0.301 0.699 
8   1.218 0.224 0.112 0.888   1.293 0.197 0.098* 0.902 
9   0.641 0.522 0.261 0.739   0.669 0.504 0.252 0.748 
10   1.474 0.141 0.071* 0.929   1.495 0.136 0.068* 0.932 
11   1.171 0.242 0.121 0.879   1.219 0.224 0.112 0.888 
12   0.069 0.945 0.473 0.527   0.132 0.895 0.448 0.552 
13   -0.792 0.429 0.786 0.214   -0.729 0.466 0.767 0.233 
14   0.703 0.482 0.241 0.759   0.775 0.439 0.219 0.781 
15   -1.284 0.200 0.900 0.100   -1.212 0.226 0.887 0.113 
16   -0.219 0.827 0.587 0.413   -0.172 0.864 0.568 0.432 
17   0.378 0.705 0.353 0.647   0.442 0.659 0.329 0.671 
18   1.411 0.159 0.080* 0.920   1.462 0.144 0.072* 0.928 
19   0.000 1.000 0.500 0.500   0.049 0.961 0.480 0.520 
20   -1.397 0.163 0.919 0.081   -1.355 0.176 0.912 0.088 
See notes of Table 2b, and 3a. 
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Table 3c: Heteroscedasticity -robust two-sample t-test results for the difference 
between voice and Schedule 13D standardized abnormal returns - the market 
model 
     Bootstrap  95% confidence interval 
Test 
Statistics 
Yuen test statistic  Guo and Luh test statistic  Yuen test 
statistic 
 Guo and Luh 
test statistic 
Event 
Day 
t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
-20 0.046 0.963 0.482 0.518  0.047 0.963 0.481 0.519  -2.050 1.949  -2.055 1.955 
-19 -0.210 0.834 0.583 0.417  -0.209 0.835 0.583 0.417  -1.897 2.050  -1.904 2.061 
-18 0.638 0.524 0.262 0.738  0.641 0.522 0.261 0.739  -1.963 1.974  -1.946 1.997 
-17 -0.363 0.717 0.642 0.358  -0.362 0.718 0.641 0.359  -2.048 2.003  -2.049 2.023 
-16 1.209 0.228 0.114 0.886  1.210 0.227 0.114 0.886  -2.016 1.885  -2.017 1.898 
-15 0.329 0.742 0.371 0.629  0.329 0.742 0.371 0.629  -1.898 1.849  -1.894 1.848 
-14 -0.379 0.705 0.648 0.352  -0.380 0.704 0.648 0.352  -2.093 2.015  -2.102 2.012 
-13 -0.362 0.718 0.641 0.359  -0.361 0.718 0.641 0.359  -2.050 1.891  -2.051 1.900 
-12 -0.596 0.552 0.724 0.276  -0.596 0.551 0.724 0.276  -1.870 1.903  -1.874 1.893 
-11 -0.244 0.807 0.596 0.404  -0.244 0.808 0.596 0.404  -2.004 1.921  -2.008 1.930 
-10 0.306 0.760 0.380 0.620  0.306 0.760 0.380 0.620  -1.965 2.032  -1.977 2.037 
-9 -2.299 0.022** 0.989 0.011**  -2.309 0.022** 0.989 0.011**  -1.879 2.019  -1.888 2.013 
-8 -0.661 0.509 0.746 0.254  -0.658 0.511 0.745 0.255  -1.952 1.924  -1.943 1.938 
-7 -0.053 0.958 0.521 0.479  -0.052 0.959 0.521 0.479  -1.937 1.898  -1.938 1.912 
-6 -0.171 0.864 0.568 0.432  -0.169 0.866 0.567 0.433  -2.086 2.004  -2.085 2.025 
-5 -0.541 0.589 0.706 0.294  -0.540 0.590 0.705 0.295  -1.930 2.052  -1.939 2.066 
-4 -1.077 0.282 0.859 0.141  -1.077 0.282 0.859 0.141  -1.983 2.107  -2.003 2.109 
-3 0.739 0.460 0.230 0.770  0.738 0.461 0.231 0.769  -1.858 1.952  -1.873 1.956 
-2 0.617 0.538 0.269 0.731  0.617 0.538 0.269 0.731  -1.948 1.925  -1.955 1.938 
-1 0.557 0.578 0.289 0.711  0.563 0.574 0.287 0.713  -2.156 1.817  -2.125 1.850 
0 1.747 0.082* 0.041** 0.959  1.768 0.078* 0.039** 0.961  -2.002 1.884  -1.993 1.940 
1 2.845 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.998  2.927 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.998  -1.991 1.713  -1.946 1.755 
2 1.389 0.166 0.083* 0.917  1.397 0.163 0.082* 0.918  -2.082 2.025  -2.066 2.042 
3 2.465 0.014** 0.007*** 0.993  2.484 0.014** 0.007*** 0.993  -1.913 2.064  -1.900 2.073 
4 1.816 0.070* 0.035** 0.965  1.818 0.070* 0.035** 0.965  -1.952 2.035  -1.959 2.035 
5 -0.173 0.863 0.569 0.431  -0.172 0.863 0.568 0.432  -2.005 2.037  -2.002 2.044 
6 0.833 0.405 0.203 0.797  0.836 0.404 0.202 0.798  -2.025 1.936  -2.021 1.944 
7 0.465 0.643 0.321 0.679  0.465 0.642 0.321 0.679  -1.880 2.035  -1.880 2.043 
8 0.486 0.627 0.314 0.686  0.488 0.626 0.313 0.687  -1.923 1.878  -1.924 1.896 
9 0.440 0.660 0.330 0.670  0.443 0.658 0.329 0.671  -1.971 1.983  -1.969 2.000 
10 1.577 0.116 0.058* 0.942  1.587 0.113 0.057 0.943  -1.951 2.051  -1.946 2.070 
11 1.062 0.289 0.145 0.855  1.067 0.287 0.143 0.857  -1.947 1.904  -1.943 1.940 
12 1.047 0.296 0.148 0.852  1.050 0.294 0.147 0.853  -1.890 1.954  -1.886 1.968 
13 -0.530 0.596 0.702 0.298  -0.530 0.596 0.702 0.298  -1.898 1.945  -1.899 1.954 
14 0.301 0.764 0.382 0.618  0.302 0.763 0.382 0.618  -1.983 1.772  -1.988 1.789 
15 -0.473 0.637 0.682 0.318  -0.472 0.637 0.682 0.318  -2.050 1.920  -2.060 1.925 
16 -0.907 0.365 0.818 0.182  -0.908 0.365 0.818 0.182  -2.057 1.904  -2.065 1.898 
17 1.242 0.215 0.107 0.893  1.243 0.215 0.107 0.893  -1.948 1.922  -1.960 1.938 
18 0.968 0.334 0.167 0.833  0.972 0.332 0.166 0.834  -1.903 1.970  -1.910 1.999 
19 -1.208 0.228 0.886 0.114  -1.203 0.230 0.885 0.115  -1.996 2.024  -2.012 2.032 
20 -0.217 0.828 0.586 0.414  -0.216 0.829 0.586 0.414  -1.955 1.905  -1.954 1.917 
Notes: this table reports the results of the two-sample tests proposed by Yuen (1974) and Guo and Luh (2000)  (denoted as Yuen 
and Hall test statistics respectively)  on the difference between the  standardized abnormal returns of voice and the  standardized 
abnormal returns of the Schedule 13D filing dates. The 95% bootstrap percentile interval is also reported for each test statistic. 
2500 replications are used in the bootstrap technique.  * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical 
significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. Results in bold indicate statistical significance at level 
5% using the confidence interval. 
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Table 3d: Heteroscedasticity -robust two sample t-test results for the difference 
between voice and Schedule 13D average standardized abnormal returns - the 
Carhart model 
     Bootstrap  95% confidence interval 
Test 
Statistics 
Yuen test statistic  Guo and Luh test statistic  Yuen test 
statistic 
 Guo and Luh 
test statistic 
Event 
Day 
t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
-20 0.026 0.979 0.490 0.510  0.027 0.979 0.489 0.511  -2.084 1.922  -2.088 1.939 
-19 -0.408 0.683 0.658 0.342  -0.408 0.684 0.658 0.342  -1.867 2.008  -1.872 2.024 
-18 0.658 0.511 0.256 0.744  0.660 0.510 0.255 0.745  -2.028 1.924  -2.024 1.930 
-17 0.027 0.979 0.489 0.511  0.027 0.979 0.489 0.511  -1.969 1.953  -1.972 1.958 
-16 0.963 0.336 0.168 0.832  0.962 0.337 0.168 0.832  -1.976 1.843  -1.985 1.845 
-15 0.613 0.540 0.270 0.730  0.613 0.540 0.270 0.730  -1.917 1.990  -1.925 1.994 
-14 -0.627 0.531 0.734 0.266  -0.627 0.531 0.734 0.266  -1.968 1.914  -1.976 1.924 
-13 0.126 0.900 0.450 0.550  0.126 0.900 0.450 0.550  -1.924 1.866  -1.936 1.870 
-12 -0.512 0.609 0.695 0.305  -0.512 0.609 0.695 0.305  -1.941 1.980  -1.937 1.992 
-11 -0.052 0.958 0.521 0.479  -0.052 0.958 0.521 0.479  -2.012 1.889  -2.016 1.892 
-10 0.279 0.780 0.390 0.610  0.279 0.780 0.390 0.610  -1.828 1.989  -1.837 1.998 
-9 -1.981 0.048** 0.976 0.024**  -1.990 0.047** 0.976 0.024**  -2.053 1.949  -2.056 1.951 
-8 -1.329 0.185 0.908 0.092*  -1.324 0.186 0.907 0.093*  -1.946 1.886  -1.944 1.908 
-7 -0.056 0.955 0.522 0.478  -0.056 0.956 0.522 0.478  -2.123 1.787  -2.135 1.801 
-6 0.485 0.628 0.314 0.686  0.487 0.627 0.313 0.687  -2.056 1.939  -2.046 1.956 
-5 -0.292 0.770 0.615 0.385  -0.291 0.772 0.614 0.386  -1.855 2.052  -1.857 2.065 
-4 -0.670 0.503 0.748 0.252  -0.670 0.503 0.748 0.252  -1.830 2.012  -1.839 2.020 
-3 1.244 0.214 0.107 0.893  1.242 0.215 0.107 0.893  -1.887 2.068  -1.903 2.078 
-2 0.972 0.332 0.166 0.834  0.970 0.333 0.166 0.834  -1.873 2.056  -1.888 2.057 
-1 0.525 0.600 0.300 0.700  0.530 0.597 0.298 0.702  -2.201 1.851  -2.172 1.884 
0 1.455 0.147 0.073* 0.927  1.466 0.144 0.072* 0.928  -1.992 1.919  -1.983 1.953 
1 2.950 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.998  3.039 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.999  -2.025 1.791  -1.982 1.836 
2 1.321 0.187 0.094* 0.906  1.328 0.185 0.093* 0.907  -2.007 1.861  -2.000 1.880 
3 2.670 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.996  2.689 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.996  -1.997 1.960  -1.988 1.974 
4 1.584 0.114 0.057* 0.943  1.586 0.114 0.057* 0.943  -1.893 1.965  -1.890 1.967 
5 -0.005 0.996 0.502 0.498  -0.003 0.998 0.501 0.499  -1.933 1.823  -1.937 1.839 
6 0.852 0.395 0.197 0.803  0.853 0.394 0.197 0.803  -1.914 1.966  -1.910 1.972 
7 0.094 0.925 0.463 0.537  0.094 0.925 0.462 0.538  -1.933 2.098  -1.938 2.103 
8 0.938 0.349 0.174 0.826  0.940 0.348 0.174 0.826  -2.038 2.001  -2.030 2.008 
9 0.069 0.945 0.472 0.528  0.070 0.944 0.472 0.528  -1.877 1.899  -1.872 1.903 
10 1.605 0.110 0.055* 0.945  1.615 0.107 0.054* 0.946  -1.890 1.989  -1.877 2.013 
11 1.134 0.257 0.129 0.871  1.141 0.255 0.127 0.873  -1.796 1.844  -1.797 1.870 
12 0.914 0.361 0.181 0.819  0.917 0.360 0.180 0.820  -2.016 1.971  -2.003 1.991 
13 -0.018 0.986 0.507 0.493  -0.018 0.986 0.507 0.493  -1.944 1.857  -1.951 1.864 
14 0.576 0.565 0.282 0.718  0.578 0.564 0.282 0.718  -1.961 1.947  -1.960 1.960 
15 -0.222 0.824 0.588 0.412  -0.222 0.825 0.588 0.412  -2.055 1.882  -2.066 1.888 
16 -0.606 0.545 0.728 0.272  -0.606 0.545 0.728 0.272  -1.967 1.923  -1.969 1.921 
17 0.963 0.336 0.168 0.832  0.965 0.335 0.167 0.833  -2.101 1.940  -2.098 1.960 
18 0.585 0.559 0.279 0.721  0.586 0.558 0.279 0.721  -2.009 1.946  -2.008 1.958 
19 -1.377 0.169 0.915 0.085*  -1.373 0.171 0.915 0.085*  -1.891 1.940  -1.890 1.956 
20 0.214 0.831 0.415 0.585  0.214 0.831 0.415 0.585  -1.967 1.959  -1.962 1.956 
See notes of Table 3c 
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Table 2e: Heteroscedasticity -robust two sample t-test results for the difference 
between voice and Schedule 13D average standardized abnormal returns - the 
GARCH-in-Mean model 
     Bootstrap  95% confidence interval 
Test 
Statistics 
Yuen test statistic  Guo and Luh test statistic  Yuen test 
statistic 
 Guo and Luh 
test statistic 
Event 
Day 
t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 
 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
-20 0.112 0.911 0.455 0.545  0.114 0.910 0.455 0.545  -2.050 1.882  -2.052 1.889 
-19 -0.378 0.705 0.647 0.353  -0.378 0.705 0.647 0.353  -1.892 2.092  -1.891 2.101 
-18 0.589 0.556 0.278 0.722  0.591 0.555 0.277 0.723  -2.002 1.976  -2.004 1.975 
-17 -0.142 0.887 0.556 0.444  -0.142 0.888 0.556 0.444  -1.843 1.903  -1.845 1.903 
-16 0.903 0.367 0.184 0.816  0.901 0.368 0.184 0.816  -1.999 1.870  -2.009 1.853 
-15 0.480 0.632 0.316 0.684  0.480 0.631 0.316 0.684  -2.019 1.972  -2.029 1.980 
-14 -0.970 0.333 0.834 0.166  -0.970 0.333 0.834 0.166  -1.966 1.847  -1.975 1.852 
-13 0.085 0.932 0.466 0.534  0.085 0.932 0.466 0.534  -1.969 1.936  -1.957 1.934 
-12 -0.708 0.479 0.760 0.240  -0.708 0.479 0.760 0.240  -2.021 2.015  -2.009 2.026 
-11 -0.211 0.833 0.584 0.416  -0.211 0.833 0.583 0.417  -1.883 1.869  -1.891 1.877 
-10 0.257 0.797 0.399 0.601  0.257 0.797 0.399 0.601  -1.902 2.021  -1.910 2.031 
-9 -2.015 0.045** 0.978 0.022**  -2.025 0.044** 0.978 0.022**  -1.837 1.903  -1.844 1.899 
-8 -1.466 0.143 0.928 0.072*  -1.463 0.144 0.928 0.072*  -1.925 1.929  -1.935 1.933 
-7 -0.204 0.838 0.581 0.419  -0.204 0.839 0.581 0.419  -1.907 1.955  -1.901 1.975 
-6 0.407 0.685 0.342 0.658  0.409 0.683 0.342 0.658  -1.990 2.033  -1.985 2.047 
-5 -0.420 0.675 0.663 0.337  -0.418 0.676 0.662 0.338  -1.824 1.959  -1.814 1.980 
-4 -0.740 0.460 0.770 0.230  -0.740 0.460 0.770 0.230  -1.895 2.005  -1.887 2.005 
-3 1.102 0.271 0.136 0.864  1.101 0.272 0.136 0.864  -1.937 1.988  -1.954 1.993 
-2 0.853 0.394 0.197 0.803  0.851 0.395 0.198 0.802  -2.035 2.033  -2.038 2.032 
-1 0.361 0.719 0.359 0.641  0.365 0.715 0.358 0.642  -2.107 1.974  -2.084 2.006 
0 1.448 0.148 0.074* 0.926  1.459 0.146 0.073* 0.927  -1.999 1.899  -1.987 1.933 
1 2.857 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.998  2.934 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.998  -2.203 1.749  -2.169 1.778 
2 1.261 0.208 0.104 0.896  1.267 0.206 0.103 0.897  -2.068 1.900  -2.053 1.913 
3 2.458 0.015** 0.007*** 0.993  2.472 0.014** 0.007*** 0.993  -1.984 2.011  -2.001 2.021 
4 1.397 0.163 0.082* 0.918  1.398 0.163 0.082* 0.918  -1.869 1.992  -1.873 2.003 
5 0.047 0.963 0.481 0.519  0.048 0.962 0.481 0.519  -2.039 1.867  -2.034 1.885 
6 0.747 0.455 0.228 0.772  0.748 0.455 0.227 0.773  -2.092 1.937  -2.094 1.942 
7 0.222 0.824 0.412 0.588  0.222 0.825 0.412 0.588  -1.955 2.022  -1.946 2.034 
8 1.024 0.306 0.153 0.847  1.027 0.305 0.153 0.847  -1.915 1.945  -1.915 1.956 
9 0.067 0.946 0.473 0.527  0.069 0.945 0.473 0.527  -2.054 1.931  -2.042 1.955 
10 1.409 0.160 0.080* 0.920  1.418 0.157 0.079* 0.921  -1.985 1.955  -1.977 1.976 
11 1.018 0.310 0.155 0.845  1.023 0.307 0.154 0.846  -2.050 1.828  -2.043 1.845 
12 0.768 0.443 0.222 0.778  0.770 0.442 0.221 0.779  -1.931 1.971  -1.932 1.993 
13 -0.093 0.926 0.537 0.463  -0.094 0.926 0.537 0.463  -1.962 1.968  -1.972 1.970 
14 0.688 0.492 0.246 0.754  0.689 0.491 0.246 0.754  -2.030 1.910  -2.035 1.913 
15 -0.118 0.906 0.547 0.453  -0.118 0.906 0.547 0.453  -1.985 1.956  -1.990 1.973 
16 -0.562 0.575 0.713 0.287  -0.562 0.574 0.713 0.287  -1.929 1.865  -1.937 1.857 
17 1.075 0.283 0.142 0.858  1.078 0.282 0.141 0.859  -1.965 2.062  -1.964 2.085 
18 0.483 0.629 0.315 0.685  0.483 0.629 0.315 0.685  -1.894 2.015  -1.894 2.032 
19 -1.461 0.145 0.928 0.072*  -1.457 0.146 0.927 0.073*  -2.003 1.997  -1.995 2.008 
20 0.120 0.905 0.452 0.548  0.120 0.904 0.452 0.548  -1.918 1.897  -1.918 1.894 
See notes of Table 3c and 3d. 
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Table 3f: Abnormal returns of voice events occurring 1 to 10 trading days before 
Schedule 13D events 
Models Market model Carhart model GARCH with Student’s t 
distribution 
Event 
Day 
AR p-val AR p-val p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
AR p-val p-val 
(Wilcoxo
n) 
-20 -0.226 0.575 -0.265 0.513 0.509 0.545 -0.282 0.497 0.503 
-19 -0.341 0.535 -0.337 0.551 0.984 0.777 -0.354 0.529 0.942 
-18 -0.734 0.565 -0.795 0.537 0.387 0.296 -0.808 0.532 0.369 
-17 -0.148 0.799 -0.170 0.778 0.965 0.830 -0.158 0.788 0.961 
-16 -0.570 0.068* -0.627 0.059* 0.023** 0.069* -0.613 0.062* 0.027** 
-15 0.096 0.857 0.127 0.819 0.822 0.601 0.132 0.807 0.837 
-14 -0.109 0.789 -0.179 0.665 0.455 0.535 -0.194 0.640 0.497 
-13 -0.285 0.484 -0.393 0.373 0.029** 0.029 -0.406 0.361 0.025 
-12 0.156 0.656 0.169 0.637 0.751 0.953 0.155 0.662 0.725 
-11 -0.518 0.118 -0.450 0.173 0.015** 0.008*** -0.478 0.153 0.013** 
-10 0.372 0.422 0.383 0.402 0.520 0.594 0.348 0.447 0.562 
-9 -0.554 0.230 -0.610 0.171 0.200 0.269 -0.639 0.160 0.218 
-8 -0.659 0.121 -0.600 0.148 0.481 0.407 -0.619 0.128 0.420 
-7 0.815 0.079* 0.829 0.067* 0.237 0.376 0.820 0.071* 0.267 
-6 0.493 0.408 0.393 0.485 0.659 0.656 0.398 0.485 0.684 
-5 -0.471 0.348 -0.433 0.386 0.365 0.342 -0.425 0.390 0.291 
-4 -0.357 0.343 -0.330 0.371 0.859 0.645 -0.327 0.375 0.844 
-3 -0.227 0.617 -0.042 0.929 0.649 0.876 -0.039 0.933 0.678 
-2 0.014 0.981 0.060 0.921 0.352 0.418 0.064 0.915 0.350 
-1 1.119 0.010** 0.981 0.028** 0.048** 0.034** 0.990 0.026** 0.037** 
0 -0.184 0.703 -0.178 0.711 0.558 0.656 -0.186 0.697 0.539 
1 0.677 0.145 0.619 0.189 0.024** 0.026 0.616 0.188 0.030** 
2 -0.376 0.520 -0.380 0.523 0.187 0.172 -0.372 0.526 0.192 
3 0.790 0.108 0.926 0.049** 0.130 0.325 0.924 0.054* 0.159 
4 0.194 0.579 0.130 0.686 0.283 0.268 0.128 0.696 0.323 
5 1.121 0.113 0.988 0.164 0.931 0.575 0.999 0.157 0.897 
6 0.675 0.078* 0.655 0.082* 0.216 0.234 0.708 0.064* 0.141 
7 0.644 0.231 0.754 0.168 0.618 0.642 0.789 0.157 0.598 
8 0.349 0.303 0.296 0.393 0.726 0.676 0.346 0.311 0.611 
9 0.471 0.218 0.412 0.273 0.484 0.520 0.444 0.236 0.552 
10 0.454 0.332 0.389 0.411 0.133 0.061* 0.410 0.379 0.113 
11 0.076 0.835 -0.038 0.913 0.527 0.652 -0.023 0.947 0.594 
12 0.384 0.428 0.207 0.674 0.818 0.867 0.218 0.656 0.799 
13 0.120 0.658 0.156 0.542 0.859 0.977 0.154 0.543 0.733 
14 0.087 0.811 0.049 0.893 0.312 0.312 0.038 0.918 0.302 
15 0.066 0.854 -0.022 0.955 0.726 0.443 -0.037 0.926 0.645 
16 0.451 0.475 0.323 0.618 0.901 0.833 0.305 0.639 0.977 
17 -0.040 0.880 -0.162 0.635 0.680 0.810 -0.179 0.606 0.669 
18 0.266 0.661 0.168 0.787 0.723 0.748 0.142 0.818 0.687 
19 -0.234 0.407 -0.332 0.258 0.316 0.449 -0.366 0.208 0.345 
20 -0.683 0.282 -0.607 0.333 0.426 0.300 -0.644 0.312 0.404 
Notes: This table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the voice date. Three models are used 
to compute the abnormal returns, namely the market model, the Carhart model, and the GARCH-in-Mean model. 
We also report the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in particular the p-value of the 
parametric test (denoted as p-val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Last column presents the 
percentage of the positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** 
indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 4a: Abnormal returns of non-voice  
Models   Market model  Carhart model % of 
+ARs Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
 AR p-val p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.720 0.024** 0.665  0.718 0.024** 0.714 44.606 
-19   0.752 0.044** 0.199  0.753 0.043** 0.272 45.436 
-18   0.354 0.144 0.156  0.383 0.114 0.317 44.813 
-17   0.165 0.429 0.104  0.183 0.380 0.296 43.776 
-16   0.032 0.868 0.266  0.018 0.926 0.292 46.266 
-15   0.013 0.955 0.069*  0.001 0.997 0.056* 44.191 
-14   0.675 0.001*** 0.269  0.711 0.001*** 0.070* 47.925 
-13   0.363 0.202 0.085*  0.314 0.267 0.043** 45.021 
-12   0.125 0.441 0.971  0.114 0.483 0.861 47.718 
-11   0.414 0.083* 0.165  0.412 0.079* 0.529 45.021 
-10   0.563 0.141 0.022**  0.595 0.121 0.033** 42.531 
-9   1.048 0.009*** 0.863  1.018 0.011** 0.867 48.133 
-8   0.847 0.017** 0.630  0.868 0.014** 0.383 47.925 
-7   1.145 0.007*** 0.610  1.156 0.006*** 0.514 48.340 
-6   0.364 0.031** 0.210  0.290 0.085* 0.678 50.830 
-5   0.157 0.261 0.784  0.124 0.359 0.865 47.510 
-4   0.087 0.449 0.179  0.063 0.582 0.346 51.452 
-3   0.708 0.122 0.932  0.709 0.123 0.909 50.207 
-2   0.145 0.510 0.078*  0.120 0.582 0.075* 42.739 
-1   0.356 0.027** 0.188  0.390 0.014** 0.089* 49.170 
0   0.532 0.007*** 0.977  0.647 0.001*** 0.123 46.888 
1   0.374 0.030** 0.180  0.389 0.021** 0.192 49.170 
2   -0.014 0.921 0.031**  -0.004 0.979 0.059* 40.664 
3   0.022 0.875 0.063*  -0.020 0.882 0.024** 42.739 
4   0.028 0.861 0.061*  -0.006 0.968 0.047** 42.946 
5   0.229 0.114 0.873  0.169 0.243 0.561 47.718 
6   0.239 0.444 0.091*  0.246 0.428 0.100 44.606 
7   -0.036 0.883 0.029**  0.006 0.979 0.263 41.494 
8   0.015 0.938 0.691  -0.059 0.761 0.628 46.888 
9   0.364 0.290 0.646  0.412 0.232 0.472 50.415 
10   -0.220 0.191 0.021**  -0.154 0.362 0.113 43.776 
11   0.227 0.291 0.098*  0.191 0.370 0.080 45.228 
12   0.121 0.594 0.177  0.128 0.581 0.124 46.058 
13   0.038 0.808 0.993  -0.013 0.934 0.803 50.415 
14   -0.232 0.079* 0.452  -0.261 0.053* 0.267 47.510 
15   0.146 0.251 0.721  0.161 0.192 0.927 48.755 
16   0.179 0.271 0.332  0.153 0.339 0.509 45.643 
17   -0.054 0.648 0.062*  -0.062 0.605 0.057* 43.568 
18   -0.078 0.569 0.182  -0.006 0.966 0.849 46.058 
19   -0.030 0.845 0.006***  -0.035 0.817 0.032** 41.286 
20   0.051 0.695 0.629  0.022 0.867 0.431 46.888 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the Schedule 13D filing date of the 
firms that were not subject to voice. Two models are used to compute the abnormal returns, namely the market 
model, and the Carhart model. We also report the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in 
particular the p-value of the parametric test (denoted as “p-val”), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
Last column presents the percentage of the positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical 
significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at 
level 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 45 
Table 4b: Abnormal returns of non-voice  
Models   GARCH-in-Mean with 
normal distribution 
 GARCH-in-Mean with 
Student’s t distribution 
% of 
+ARs 
Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
 AR p-val p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.733 0.020** 0.690  0.728 0.021** 0.618 48.548 
-19   0.802 0.034** 0.332  0.792 0.037** 0.310 46.266 
-18   0.434 0.070* 0.474  0.421 0.079* 0.401 45.021 
-17   0.215 0.310 0.334  0.198 0.349 0.319 46.266 
-16   0.049 0.808 0.344  0.034 0.867 0.292 45.436 
-15   0.034 0.881 0.065  0.020 0.930 0.056* 44.191 
-14   0.747 0.000*** 0.033**  0.736 0.000*** 0.045** 50.830 
-13   0.347 0.225 0.075*  0.333 0.244 0.053* 47.510 
-12   0.153 0.352 0.846  0.138 0.400 0.953 49.585 
-11   0.449 0.058* 0.757  0.432 0.068* 0.629 47.925 
-10   0.632 0.106 0.063*  0.615 0.116 0.041** 43.983 
-9   1.095 0.009*** 0.731  1.081 0.010** 0.795 47.718 
-8   0.960 0.008*** 0.239  0.953 0.008*** 0.277 49.585 
-7   1.248 0.003*** 0.288  1.240 0.003*** 0.365 49.585 
-6   0.365 0.030** 0.492  0.352 0.036** 0.561 50.622 
-5   0.194 0.178 0.815  0.178 0.218 0.926 48.340 
-4   0.128 0.300 0.164  0.114 0.356 0.234 52.282 
-3   0.769 0.096* 0.812  0.757 0.100 0.875 49.378 
-2   0.161 0.465 0.161  0.164 0.457 0.160 44.191 
-1   0.428 0.007*** 0.037**  0.427 0.007*** 0.042** 51.660 
0   0.683 0.002*** 0.108  0.676 0.002*** 0.131 47.510 
1   0.440 0.009*** 0.110  0.431 0.010** 0.133 51.037 
2   0.043 0.773 0.099*  0.033 0.823 0.070* 42.946 
3   0.027 0.843 0.077*  0.015 0.912 0.053* 43.776 
4   0.039 0.801 0.081*  0.027 0.859 0.060* 44.813 
5   0.211 0.158 0.744  0.198 0.186 0.598 47.303 
6   0.286 0.358 0.204  0.271 0.383 0.154 45.436 
7   0.043 0.864 0.272  0.036 0.882 0.251 45.851 
8   
-
0.025 0.898 0.688  -0.029 0.881 0.629 47.095 
9   0.449 0.198 0.430  0.450 0.193 0.443 50.622 
10   
-
0.116 0.481 0.187  -0.114 0.490 0.217 47.303 
11   0.226 0.299 0.173  0.222 0.299 0.188 44.398 
12   0.162 0.477 0.225  0.159 0.486 0.234 47.303 
13   0.019 0.910 0.970  0.013 0.939 0.918 49.793 
14   
-
0.230 0.087* 0.375  -0.238 0.078* 0.343 46.473 
15   0.192 0.124 0.712  0.187 0.137 0.772 47.095 
16   0.181 0.261 0.633  0.178 0.270 0.663 45.436 
17   
-
0.031 0.794 0.113  -0.035 0.769 0.101 45.436 
18   0.021 0.875 0.942  0.017 0.900 0.991 49.378 
19   
-
0.007 0.966 0.058*  -0.013 0.934 0.056* 44.191 
20   0.051 0.706 0.700  0.048 0.722 0.679 48.133 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the Schedule 13D filing date of the 
firms that were not subject to voice. The abnormal returns are computed by using the model
  ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR  
 
where ith are the conditional variances. Two models are used to estimate the conditional variances, namely a 
GARCH(1,1) model based on normal distribution, and a GARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution 
with unknown degrees of freedom. We also report the p-values on the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test (denoted as “p-val”), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the positive abnormal returns for each event date. * 
indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates 
statistical significance at level 1%. 
 
 46 
 
 
 
Table 5a: Testing for the difference between the standardized abnormal returns 
of voice and non-voice  
Models   Market Model   Carhart Model  
Event 
Day 
  t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
-20   -1.740 0.082* 0.959 0.041**  -1.722 0.085* 0.957 0.043** 
-19   -2.560 0.011** 0.995 0.005***  -2.650 0.008*** 0.996 0.004*** 
-18   0.188 0.851 0.426 0.574  0.177 0.859 0.430 0.570 
-17   -0.673 0.501 0.749 0.251  -0.605 0.545 0.727 0.273 
-16   0.012 0.990 0.495 0.505  -0.069 0.945 0.527 0.473 
-15   -0.772 0.440 0.780 0.220  -0.496 0.620 0.690 0.310 
-14   -1.942 0.053* 0.974 0.026**  -2.061 0.040** 0.980 0.020** 
-13   -1.257 0.209 0.895 0.105  -1.044 0.297 0.852 0.148 
-12   -1.146 0.252 0.874 0.126  -0.965 0.335 0.833 0.167 
-11   -1.460 0.145 0.928 0.072*  -1.369 0.172 0.914 0.086* 
-10   -1.671 0.095* 0.952 0.048**  -1.650 0.099* 0.950 0.050* 
-9   -3.713 0.000*** 1.000 0.000***  -3.607 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 
-8   -1.847 0.065* 0.967 0.033**  -2.068 0.039** 0.981 0.019** 
-7   -2.209 0.027** 0.986 0.014**  -2.242 0.025** 0.987 0.013** 
-6   -0.338 0.736 0.632 0.368  0.049 0.961 0.481 0.519 
-5   0.360 0.719 0.360 0.640  0.474 0.636 0.318 0.682 
-4   -1.053 0.293 0.854 0.146  -0.928 0.354 0.823 0.177 
-3   -1.122 0.262 0.869 0.131  -0.986 0.324 0.838 0.162 
-2   -1.120 0.263 0.868 0.132  -1.130 0.259 0.871 0.129 
-1   0.535 0.593 0.297 0.703  0.379 0.705 0.352 0.648 
0   2.861 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.998  2.589 0.010** 0.005*** 0.995 
1   3.830 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000  3.764 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
2   2.452 0.015** 0.007*** 0.993  2.459 0.014** 0.007*** 0.993 
3   2.490 0.013** 0.007*** 0.993  2.638 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.996 
4   1.765 0.078* 0.039** 0.961  1.434 0.152 0.076* 0.924 
5   -0.010 0.992 0.504 0.496  -0.094 0.925 0.537 0.463 
6   0.838 0.402 0.201 0.799  0.722 0.471 0.235 0.765 
7   1.239 0.216 0.108 0.892  0.979 0.328 0.164 0.836 
8   0.575 0.566 0.283 0.717  1.171 0.242 0.121 0.879 
9   1.145 0.253 0.126 0.874  0.943 0.346 0.173 0.827 
10   2.097 0.037** 0.018** 0.982  1.904 0.058* 0.029** 0.971 
11   0.921 0.357 0.179 0.821  0.934 0.351 0.176 0.824 
12   0.134 0.894 0.447 0.553  0.174 0.862 0.431 0.569 
13   -0.614 0.540 0.730 0.270  -0.251 0.802 0.599 0.401 
14   1.008 0.314 0.157 0.843  1.213 0.226 0.113 0.887 
15   -1.160 0.246 0.877 0.123  -1.133 0.258 0.871 0.129 
16   -0.163 0.871 0.565 0.435  0.143 0.886 0.443 0.557 
17   0.565 0.572 0.286 0.714  0.520 0.603 0.302 0.698 
18   1.473 0.142 0.071* 0.929  1.026 0.305 0.153 0.847 
19   0.562 0.575 0.287 0.713  0.330 0.742 0.371 0.629 
20   -1.563 0.119 0.941 0.059*  -1.351 0.177 0.911 0.089* 
Notes: the table reports the test results of the difference between the average standardized abnormal returns of 
voice and the average standardized abnormal returns of non-voice. Vt  denotes the average standardized abnormal 
returns of voice, while NVt  denotes the average abnormal returns of non-voice. We report the p-value of the t-
statistic when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  NVtVtH   . “p-val right” denotes the p-value of the t-statistic 
when the alternative hypothesis is 0:1  NVtVtH  .  “p-val left” denotes the p-value of the t-statistic when the 
alternative hypothesis is 0:1  StVtH  . * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates statistical 
significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 5b: Testing for the difference between the standardized abnormal returns 
of voice and non-voice  
Models   GARCH-in-Mean with normal 
distribution 
 GARCH-in-Mean with Student’s 
t distribution 
Event 
Day 
  t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
 t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
-20   -1.738 0.083* 0.959 0.041**  -1.717 0.086* 0.957 0.043** 
-19   -2.719 0.007*** 0.997 0.003***  -2.695 0.007*** 0.996 0.004*** 
-18   0.088 0.930 0.465 0.535  0.113 0.910 0.455 0.545 
-17   -0.731 0.465 0.768 0.232  -0.662 0.508 0.746 0.254 
-16   -0.223 0.824 0.588 0.412  -0.151 0.880 0.560 0.440 
-15   -0.618 0.537 0.732 0.268  -0.568 0.570 0.715 0.285 
-14   -2.221 0.027** 0.987 0.013**  -2.195 0.029** 0.986 0.014** 
-13   -1.159 0.247 0.877 0.123  -1.126 0.261 0.870 0.130 
-12   -1.136 0.256 0.872 0.128  -1.100 0.272 0.864 0.136 
-11   -1.497 0.135 0.933 0.067*  -1.449 0.148 0.926 0.074* 
-10   -1.723 0.085* 0.957 0.043**  -1.684 0.093* 0.954 0.046** 
-9   -3.719 0.000*** 1.000 0.000***  -3.670 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 
-8   -2.233 0.026** 0.987 0.013**  -2.207 0.028** 0.986 0.014** 
-7   -2.411 0.016** 0.992 0.008***  -2.385 0.017** 0.991 0.009*** 
-6   -0.168 0.867 0.567 0.433  -0.104 0.917 0.541 0.459 
-5   0.232 0.816 0.408 0.592  0.299 0.765 0.382 0.618 
-4   -1.165 0.245 0.878 0.122  -1.090 0.277 0.862 0.138 
-3   -1.143 0.253 0.873 0.127  -1.103 0.270 0.865 0.135 
-2   -1.220 0.223 0.889 0.111  -1.224 0.222 0.889 0.111 
-1   0.308 0.758 0.379 0.621  0.308 0.758 0.379 0.621 
0   2.422 0.016** 0.008*** 0.992  2.430 0.016** 0.008*** 0.992 
1   3.670 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000  3.696 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
2   2.196 0.029** 0.014** 0.986  2.225 0.027** 0.013** 0.987 
3   2.360 0.019** 0.009*** 0.991  2.426 0.016** 0.008*** 0.992 
4   1.195 0.232 0.116 0.884  1.297 0.195 0.098* 0.902 
5   -0.279 0.780 0.610 0.390  -0.196 0.844 0.578 0.422 
6   0.544 0.586 0.293 0.707  0.629 0.530 0.265 0.735 
7   0.821 0.412 0.206 0.794  0.893 0.373 0.186 0.814 
8   0.982 0.326 0.163 0.837  1.061 0.289 0.145 0.855 
9   0.817 0.415 0.207 0.793  0.848 0.397 0.198 0.802 
10   1.756 0.080* 0.040** 0.960  1.777 0.076* 0.038** 0.962 
11   0.850 0.396 0.198 0.802  0.905 0.366 0.183 0.817 
12   0.107 0.914 0.457 0.543  0.171 0.865 0.432 0.568 
13   -0.330 0.742 0.629 0.371  -0.258 0.796 0.602 0.398 
14   1.146 0.252 0.126 0.874  1.230 0.219 0.110 0.890 
15   -1.190 0.234 0.883 0.117  -1.110 0.268 0.866 0.134 
16   0.094 0.925 0.463 0.537  0.139 0.890 0.445 0.555 
17   0.448 0.654 0.327 0.673  0.514 0.607 0.304 0.696 
18   0.974 0.331 0.165 0.835  1.026 0.305 0.153 0.847 
19   0.288 0.773 0.387 0.613  0.340 0.734 0.367 0.633 
20   -1.392 0.165 0.918 0.082*  -1.342 0.180 0.910 0.090* 
See Notes of Table 5a 
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Table 6: Robustness check - abnormal returns of Schedule 13D filings 
Models   EGARCH with Student’s  t 
distribution 
  GJR-GARCH with 
Student’s t distribution 
% of 
+ARs 
Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.413 0.048** 0.300   0.407 0.051* 0.272 48.624 
-19   0.397 0.137 0.032**   0.379 0.152 0.039** 45.085 
-18   0.468 0.180 0.029**   0.446 0.197 0.024** 44.037 
-17   0.170 0.270 0.578   0.157 0.298 0.492 47.575 
-16   0.002 0.991 0.223   -0.013 0.932 0.192 45.872 
-15   0.004 0.980 0.346   -0.011 0.948 0.282 46.920 
-14   0.588 0.000*** 0.078*   0.575 0.000*** 0.117 50.328 
-13   0.199 0.398 0.002***   0.183 0.430 0.001*** 45.216 
-12   0.123 0.365 0.472   0.112 0.400 0.553 50.721 
-11   0.084 0.643 0.122   0.071 0.693 0.097* 46.920 
-10   0.330 0.206 0.054*   0.319 0.217 0.044** 46.003 
-9   0.696 0.011** 0.834   0.696 0.011** 0.832 47.444 
-8   0.727 0.003*** 0.148   0.721 0.003*** 0.133 51.245 
-7   0.669 0.020** 0.742   0.670 0.018** 0.664 49.148 
-6   0.567 0.001*** 0.020**   0.568 0.001*** 0.019** 53.866 
-5   0.445 0.003*** 0.073   0.444 0.003*** 0.063* 51.114 
-4   0.151 0.215 0.498   0.161 0.186 0.473 50.721 
-3   0.478 0.119 0.534   0.474 0.118 0.475 50.721 
-2   0.044 0.825 0.538   0.026 0.897 0.592 48.100 
-1   0.483 0.000*** 0.001***   0.462 0.000*** 0.001*** 53.211 
0   0.900 0.000*** 0.000***   0.881 0.000*** 0.000*** 54.260 
1   0.692 0.000*** 0.000***   0.681 0.000*** 0.000*** 54.522 
2   0.150 0.235 0.611   0.147 0.240 0.554 45.609 
3   0.039 0.734 0.318   0.039 0.728 0.278 46.658 
4   0.183 0.147 0.639   0.183 0.146 0.557 47.969 
5   0.133 0.282 0.626   0.132 0.282 0.754 50.066 
6   0.319 0.126 0.653   0.317 0.125 0.665 47.182 
7   0.139 0.445 0.331   0.141 0.435 0.342 47.575 
8   
-
0.034 0.815 0.292   -0.038 0.796 0.274 46.920 
9   0.399 0.080* 0.074*   0.384 0.071* 0.084* 53.866 
10   0.052 0.680 0.886   0.039 0.776 0.969 49.148 
11   0.125 0.406 0.133   0.110 0.425 0.127 47.182 
12   0.102 0.545 0.334   0.094 0.582 0.333 49.017 
13   0.153 0.316 0.982   0.144 0.347 0.900 51.900 
14   
-
0.116 0.397 0.095*   -0.117 0.398 0.076* 46.527 
15   0.182 0.146 0.863   0.183 0.140 0.818 48.100 
16   0.286 0.039** 0.868   0.286 0.037** 0.825 48.231 
17   
-
0.037 0.734 0.236   -0.033 0.759 0.245 47.706 
18   
-
0.069 0.603 0.557   -0.066 0.616 0.595 48.755 
19   0.027 0.817 0.128   0.028 0.802 0.137 46.658 
20   0.051 0.684 0.593   0.054 0.664 0.606 48.755 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the Schedule 13D filing date. The 
abnormal returns are computed by using the model
  ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR  
 
where ith are the conditional variances. Two models are used to estimate the conditional variances, namely a 
EGARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution with unknown degrees of freedom, and a GJR-
GARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution with unknown degrees of freedom. We also report the p-
values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test 
(denoted as p-val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the 
positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates 
statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 7: Robustness check - abnormal returns of voice  
Models   EGARCH with Student’s  t 
distribution 
 GJR-GARCH with Student’s 
t distribution 
% of 
+ARs 
Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
 AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.005 0.982 0.560  0.012 0.959 0.563 46.643 
-19   -0.419 0.124 0.120  -0.413 0.129 0.129 44.876 
-18   0.812 0.352 0.463  0.816 0.350 0.444 46.996 
-17   0.043 0.840 0.779  0.017 0.937 0.677 47.350 
-16   0.006 0.974 0.657  -0.025 0.889 0.689 50.530 
-15   -0.085 0.719 0.909  -0.114 0.632 0.783 45.936 
-14   -0.114 0.642 0.933  -0.139 0.568 0.784 48.763 
-13   -0.075 0.774 0.097*  -0.098 0.707 0.082 45.230 
-12   -0.095 0.673 0.627  -0.117 0.602 0.475 47.350 
-11   -0.118 0.609 0.172  -0.134 0.558 0.127 46.643 
-10   -0.115 0.600 0.559  -0.127 0.566 0.521 48.763 
-9   -0.412 0.047** 0.041**  -0.419 0.043** 0.032** 45.230 
-8   -0.019 0.941 0.254  -0.027 0.915 0.253 48.057 
-7   -0.108 0.758 0.900  -0.118 0.737 0.873 49.470 
-6   0.462 0.194 0.195  0.456 0.199 0.173 53.357 
-5   0.152 0.587 0.981  0.145 0.606 0.980 49.117 
-4   -0.116 0.633 0.785  -0.121 0.620 0.740 50.177 
-3   -0.074 0.784 0.102  -0.079 0.769 0.109 56.890 
-2   -0.003 0.993 0.520  -0.005 0.989 0.581 50.530 
-1   0.424 0.150 0.053*  0.425 0.146 0.061* 53.710 
0   1.066 0.004*** 0.000***  1.067 0.004*** 0.000*** 61.484 
1   1.817 0.000*** 0.000***  1.816 0.000*** 0.000*** 56.890 
2   0.538 0.026** 0.262  0.536 0.027** 0.251 50.177 
3   0.529 0.032** 0.026**  0.528 0.034** 0.032** 52.650 
4   0.438 0.030** 0.045**  0.435 0.030** 0.054* 54.417 
5   0.210 0.455 0.968  0.205 0.468 0.966 49.117 
6   0.311 0.115 0.326  0.296 0.136 0.387 55.124 
7   0.345 0.193 0.994  0.338 0.198 0.980 50.177 
8   0.294 0.177 0.757  0.284 0.194 0.829 49.470 
9   0.279 0.433 0.501  0.274 0.445 0.569 50.530 
10   0.705 0.029** 0.187  0.712 0.031** 0.185 51.590 
11   0.146 0.490 0.791  0.159 0.457 0.822 48.763 
12   -0.043 0.814 0.945  -0.031 0.867 0.941 49.117 
13   0.027 0.888 0.877  0.039 0.838 0.857 49.470 
14   0.094 0.585 0.757  0.106 0.534 0.825 46.643 
15   0.074 0.681 0.564  0.088 0.626 0.659 45.936 
16   0.232 0.327 0.759  0.242 0.305 0.854 51.590 
17   -0.078 0.638 0.838  -0.062 0.708 0.735 50.883 
18   0.399 0.135 0.865  0.412 0.121 0.839 48.763 
19   0.034 0.887 0.058*  0.052 0.831 0.055* 41.696 
20   -0.129 0.594 0.922  -0.113 0.636 0.935 48.057 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the voice date. The abnormal returns 
are computed by using the model   ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR  
 
where ith are the conditional variances. Two models are used to estimate the conditional variances, namely a 
EGARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution with unknown degrees of freedom, and a GJR-
GARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution with unknown degrees of freedom. We also report the p-
values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test 
(denoted as p-val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the 
positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates 
statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 8: Robustness - Abnormal returns of non-voice  
Models   EGARCH with Student’s  t 
distribution 
  GJR-GARCH with Student’s t 
distribution 
% of 
+ARs 
Event 
Day 
  AR p-val  p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
  AR p-val p-val 
(Wilcoxon) 
-20   0.751 0.018** 0.742   0.730 0.021** 0.663 49.895 
-19   0.835 0.031** 0.323   0.795 0.037** 0.343 46.947 
-18   0.465 0.058* 0.476   0.427 0.076* 0.410 45.684 
-17   0.214 0.328 0.384   0.207 0.329 0.352 47.368 
-16   0.048 0.821 0.421   0.038 0.852 0.342 45.684 
-15   0.034 0.883 0.089*   0.027 0.905 0.075* 44.632 
-14   0.766 0.000*** 0.023**   0.759 0.000*** 0.029** 52.211 
-13   0.361 0.218 0.092*   0.348 0.223 0.076* 47.368 
-12   0.163 0.334 0.769   0.159 0.336 0.766 50.526 
-11   0.462 0.056* 0.790   0.449 0.058* 0.761 48.000 
-10   0.641 0.107 0.085*   0.627 0.108 0.082* 44.842 
-9   1.092 0.009*** 0.668   1.091 0.009*** 0.601 48.421 
-8   0.974 0.007*** 0.220   0.965 0.007*** 0.206 50.737 
-7   1.253 0.003*** 0.326   1.252 0.003*** 0.265 49.684 
-6   0.361 0.034** 0.411   0.370 0.027** 0.371 51.579 
-5   0.186 0.197 0.849   0.193 0.175 0.695 48.632 
-4   0.117 0.336 0.201   0.137 0.256 0.156 51.579 
-3   0.769 0.101 0.856   0.768 0.096* 0.708 49.263 
-2   0.161 0.472 0.167   0.137 0.565 0.207 44.842 
-1   0.432 0.007*** 0.041**   0.406 0.011** 0.033** 52.632 
0   0.688 0.001*** 0.122   0.669 0.002*** 0.102 48.632 
1   0.434 0.010** 0.094*   0.427 0.011** 0.109 52.842 
2   0.032 0.825 0.117   0.034 0.818 0.109 43.789 
3   0.014 0.921 0.081*   0.017 0.903 0.075* 44.632 
4   0.027 0.861 0.101   0.029 0.850 0.082* 45.684 
5   0.201 0.181 0.777   0.197 0.184 0.672 48.000 
6   0.276 0.381 0.189   0.271 0.382 0.190 45.684 
7   0.032 0.900 0.291   0.034 0.891 0.308 45.895 
8   
-
0.035 0.860 0.777   -0.045 0.825 0.742 48.211 
9   0.452 0.198 0.329   0.424 0.191 0.362 53.053 
10   
-
0.124 0.464 0.224   -0.146 0.435 0.264 47.789 
11   0.223 0.306 0.241   0.195 0.315 0.231 47.158 
12   0.155 0.503 0.238   0.139 0.552 0.244 48.842 
13   0.012 0.942 0.897   0.000 0.999 0.959 52.842 
14   
-
0.243 0.077* 0.410   -0.245 0.071* 0.348 48.000 
15   0.187 0.142 0.649   0.184 0.144 0.742 49.263 
16   0.179 0.273 0.758   0.178 0.270 0.696 47.368 
17   
-
0.039 0.752 0.126   -0.035 0.773 0.121 46.526 
18   0.018 0.894 0.939   0.019 0.889 0.936 49.895 
19   
-
0.012 0.939 0.073*   -0.012 0.939 0.069* 46.105 
20   0.046 0.741 0.738   0.044 0.744 0.676 49.263 
Notes: this table reports the abnormal stock returns 20 days before and after the Schedule 13D filing date of the 
firms that were not subject to voice until exit. The abnormal returns are computed by using the model
  ,543210 itittttftmtit uhMOMHMLSMBRRaR  
 
where ith are the conditional variances. Two models are used to estimate the conditional variances, namely a 
EGARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution with unknown degrees of freedom, and a GJR-
GARCH(1,1) model based on Student’s t distribution with unknown degrees of freedom. We also report the p-
values on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, in particular the p-value of the parametric test 
(denoted as p-val), and the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Last column presents the percentage of the 
positive abnormal returns for each event date. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** indicates 
statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 9: Robustness - Testing for the difference between the standardized 
abnormal returns of voice and Schedule 13D filing dates  
Models   EGARCH with 
Student’s  t distribution 
   GJR-GARCH with 
Student’s t 
distribution 
 
Event 
Day 
  t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
  t-
test 
p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
-20   -1.120 0.263 0.868 0.132   -1.102 0.271 0.865 0.135 
-19   -2.422 0.016** 0.992 0.008***   -2.406 0.016** 0.992 0.008*** 
-18   0.300 0.764 0.382 0.618   0.317 0.751 0.376 0.624 
-17   -0.629 0.529 0.735 0.265   -0.838 0.402 0.799 0.201 
-16   0.214 0.830 0.415 0.585   0.034 0.973 0.487 0.513 
-15   -0.696 0.487 0.757 0.243   -0.811 0.418 0.791 0.209 
-14   -1.737 0.083* 0.958 0.042**   -1.885 0.060* 0.970 0.030** 
-13   -0.645 0.519 0.740 0.260   -0.722 0.471 0.765 0.235 
-12   -1.013 0.312 0.844 0.156   -1.136 0.257 0.872 0.128 
-11   -0.402 0.687 0.656 0.344   -0.469 0.639 0.680 0.320 
-10   -1.254 0.210 0.895 0.105   -1.296 0.195 0.902 0.098* 
-9   -3.426 0.001*** 1.000 0.000***   -3.516 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 
-8   -2.022 0.044** 0.978 0.022**   -2.080 0.038** 0.981 0.019** 
-7   -1.602 0.110 0.945 0.055*   -1.659 0.098* 0.951 0.049** 
-6   -0.533 0.595 0.703 0.297   -0.597 0.551 0.725 0.275 
-5   -0.498 0.618 0.691 0.309   -0.555 0.579 0.710 0.290 
-4   -1.132 0.258 0.871 0.129   -1.212 0.226 0.887 0.113 
-3   -0.711 0.477 0.761 0.239   -0.755 0.451 0.775 0.225 
-2   -0.861 0.390 0.805 0.195   -0.882 0.378 0.811 0.189 
-1   0.073 0.942 0.471 0.529   0.070 0.944 0.472 0.528 
0   1.353 0.177 0.088* 0.912   1.330 0.184 0.092* 0.908 
1   3.159 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.999   3.152 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.999 
2   1.867 0.063* 0.031** 0.969   1.825 0.069* 0.034** 0.966 
3   2.520 0.012** 0.006*** 0.994   2.453 0.015** 0.007*** 0.993 
4   0.555 0.579 0.290 0.710   0.504 0.614 0.307 0.693 
5   -0.063 0.950 0.525 0.475   -0.112 0.911 0.545 0.455 
6   -0.028 0.978 0.511 0.489   -0.085 0.933 0.534 0.466 
7   0.546 0.585 0.293 0.707   0.512 0.609 0.304 0.696 
8   1.320 0.187 0.094* 0.906   1.273 0.203 0.102 0.898 
9   0.678 0.498 0.249 0.751   0.662 0.508 0.254 0.746 
10   1.518 0.130 0.065* 0.935   1.497 0.135 0.068* 0.932 
11   1.151 0.251 0.125 0.875   1.195 0.233 0.116 0.884 
12   0.059 0.953 0.476 0.524   0.102 0.918 0.459 0.541 
13   -0.791 0.429 0.785 0.215   -0.758 0.449 0.775 0.225 
14   0.723 0.470 0.235 0.765   0.746 0.456 0.228 0.772 
15   -1.255 0.210 0.895 0.105   -1.232 0.219 0.891 0.109 
16   -0.195 0.846 0.577 0.423   -0.187 0.851 0.574 0.426 
17   0.406 0.685 0.342 0.658   0.424 0.672 0.336 0.664 
18   1.426 0.154 0.077* 0.923   1.439 0.151 0.075* 0.925 
19   0.009 0.993 0.496 0.504   0.033 0.973 0.487 0.513 
20   -1.381 0.168 0.916 0.084*   -1.373 0.170 0.915 0.085* 
See notes of Table 3a 
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Table 10: Robustness - Testing for the difference between the standardized 
abnormal returns of voice and non-voice   
Models   EGARCH with Student’s  t 
distribution 
   GJR-GARCH with 
Student’s t distribution 
 
Event 
Day 
  t-test p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
  t-
test 
p-val p-val 
right 
p-val 
left 
-20   -1.755 0.080* 0.960 0.040**   -1.731 0.084* 0.958 0.042** 
-19   -2.735 0.006*** 0.997 0.003***   -2.717 0.007*** 0.997 0.003*** 
-18   0.068 0.946 0.473 0.527   0.096 0.923 0.462 0.538 
-17   -0.407 0.684 0.658 0.342   -0.694 0.488 0.756 0.244 
-16   0.058 0.954 0.477 0.523   -0.197 0.844 0.578 0.422 
-15   -0.425 0.671 0.664 0.336   -0.598 0.550 0.725 0.275 
-14   -1.999 0.046** 0.977 0.023**   -2.223 0.027** 0.987 0.013** 
-13   -1.022 0.307 0.846 0.154   -1.141 0.254 0.873 0.127 
-12   -0.975 0.330 0.835 0.165   -1.153 0.249 0.875 0.125 
-11   -1.384 0.167 0.917 0.083*   -1.495 0.135 0.932 0.068* 
-10   -1.659 0.098* 0.951 0.049**   -1.715 0.087* 0.957 0.043** 
-9   -3.634 0.000*** 1.000 0.000***   -3.732 0.000*** 1.000 0.000*** 
-8   -2.180 0.030** 0.985 0.015**   -2.251 0.025** 0.988 0.012** 
-7   -2.330 0.020** 0.990 0.010**   -2.407 0.016** 0.992 0.008*** 
-6   -0.055 0.956 0.522 0.478   -0.158 0.875 0.563 0.437 
-5   0.349 0.727 0.364 0.636   0.255 0.799 0.400 0.600 
-4   -1.036 0.301 0.850 0.150   -1.173 0.241 0.879 0.121 
-3   -1.067 0.287 0.857 0.143   -1.137 0.256 0.872 0.128 
-2   -1.190 0.235 0.883 0.117   -1.224 0.221 0.889 0.111 
-1   0.313 0.754 0.377 0.623   0.300 0.765 0.382 0.618 
0   2.479 0.014** 0.007*** 0.993   2.427 0.016** 0.008*** 0.992 
1   3.725 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000   3.698 0.000*** 0.000*** 1.000 
2   2.407 0.016** 0.008*** 0.992   2.335 0.020** 0.010** 0.990 
3   2.573 0.010** 0.005*** 0.995   2.483 0.013** 0.007*** 0.993 
4   1.380 0.168 0.084* 0.916   1.321 0.187 0.094* 0.906 
5   -0.143 0.886 0.557 0.443   -0.200 0.841 0.579 0.421 
6   0.664 0.507 0.254 0.746   0.608 0.543 0.272 0.728 
7   0.918 0.359 0.180 0.820   0.876 0.381 0.191 0.809 
8   1.088 0.277 0.138 0.862   1.042 0.298 0.149 0.851 
9   0.862 0.389 0.195 0.805   0.846 0.398 0.199 0.801 
10   1.812 0.071* 0.035** 0.965   1.784 0.075* 0.038** 0.962 
11   0.841 0.401 0.201 0.799   0.889 0.375 0.187 0.813 
12   0.114 0.910 0.455 0.545   0.146 0.884 0.442 0.558 
13   -0.320 0.749 0.625 0.375   -0.294 0.769 0.615 0.385 
14   1.156 0.248 0.124 0.876   1.188 0.236 0.118 0.882 
15   -1.167 0.244 0.878 0.122   -1.139 0.255 0.872 0.128 
16   0.110 0.913 0.456 0.544   0.114 0.909 0.455 0.545 
17   0.475 0.635 0.317 0.683   0.485 0.628 0.314 0.686 
18   0.988 0.324 0.162 0.838   0.994 0.321 0.160 0.840 
19   0.304 0.761 0.381 0.619   0.317 0.751 0.376 0.624 
20   -1.373 0.170 0.915 0.085*   -1.368 0.172 0.914 0.086* 
See Notes of Table 5a 
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Table 11: Robustness - Corrado rank test results of the Schedule 13D abnormal 
returns  
Models Market Model Carhart Model GARCH EGARCH GJR-GARCH 
Event Day      
-20 0.758 0.428 0.684 0.580 0.490 
-19 0.990 0.641 0.998 0.887 0.834 
-18 0.964 0.608 0.980 0.861 0.809 
-17 0.964 0.913 0.793 0.787 0.914 
-16 0.948 0.998 0.641 0.661 0.763 
-15 0.850 0.902 0.592 0.610 0.718 
-14 0.851 0.959 0.645 0.668 0.776 
-13 0.592 0.764 0.424 0.470 0.526 
-12 0.405 0.587 0.298 0.374 0.376 
-11 0.332 0.429 0.192 0.254 0.246 
-10 0.205 0.370 0.162 0.221 0.225 
-9 0.192 0.375 0.160 0.219 0.198 
-8 0.107 0.212 0.076* 0.099* 0.096* 
-7 0.121 0.202 0.060* 0.093* 0.086* 
-6 0.127 0.208 0.070* 0.114 0.096* 
-5 0.169 0.251 0.092* 0.126 0.112 
-4 0.125 0.184 0.084* 0.108 0.099* 
-3 0.125 0.169 0.066* 0.082* 0.087* 
-2 0.114 0.145 0.060* 0.061* 0.076* 
-1 0.124 0.175 0.072* 0.071* 0.082* 
0 0.157 0.195 0.086* 0.091* 0.100 
1 0.140 0.221 0.093* 0.074* 0.098* 
2 0.184 0.280 0.117 0.110 0.123 
3 0.231 0.323 0.146 0.142 0.162 
4 0.274 0.362 0.168 0.167 0.185 
5 0.270 0.334 0.160 0.152 0.189 
6 0.254 0.327 0.171 0.145 0.189 
7 0.245 0.289 0.163 0.124 0.181 
8 0.256 0.317 0.182 0.123 0.205 
9 0.314 0.382 0.229 0.165 0.256 
10 0.349 0.387 0.263 0.183 0.260 
11 0.388 0.401 0.274 0.195 0.266 
12 0.343 0.353 0.244 0.173 0.221 
13 0.399 0.357 0.284 0.220 0.273 
14 0.421 0.373 0.263 0.208 0.267 
15 0.425 0.401 0.288 0.234 0.288 
16 0.375 0.400 0.286 0.246 0.295 
17 0.415 0.435 0.327 0.289 0.328 
18 0.431 0.417 0.266 0.262 0.264 
19 0.465 0.504 0.306 0.297 0.284 
20 0.536 0.525 0.319 0.329 0.329 
Notes: This table reports the p-values of the Corrado rank test on the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns. The abnormal returns of each stock are estimated using an estimation window of 212 observations 
(Schedule 13D and non-voice) and 198 observations (voice), respectively. * indicates statistical significance at 
level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 12: Robustness - Corrado rank test results of the voice abnormal returns  
Models Market Model Carhart Model GARCH EGARCH GJR-GARCH 
Event Day      
-20 0.537 0.152 0.203 0.171 0.169 
-19 0.933 0.335 0.411 0.399 0.394 
-18 0.962 0.424 0.517 0.485 0.476 
-17 0.889 0.489 0.555 0.522 0.526 
-16 0.975 0.680 0.770 0.708 0.666 
-15 0.849 0.816 0.889 0.834 0.773 
-14 0.755 0.925 0.990 0.950 0.893 
-13 0.491 0.774 0.682 0.738 0.805 
-12 0.360 0.646 0.714 0.644 0.599 
-11 0.340 0.738 0.823 0.718 0.709 
-10 0.246 0.613 0.688 0.587 0.570 
-9 0.190 0.489 0.631 0.517 0.411 
-8 0.074* 0.288 0.302 0.230 0.142 
-7 0.036** 0.222 0.218 0.172 0.137 
-6 0.041** 0.193 0.113 0.131 0.129 
-5 0.049** 0.196 0.120 0.148 0.141 
-4 0.044** 0.159 0.094* 0.111 0.085* 
-3 0.040** 0.171 0.135 0.143 0.114 
-2 0.005*** 0.014** 0.015** 0.012** 0.013** 
-1 0.004*** 0.013** 0.015** 0.021** 0.015** 
0 0.007*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.020** 0.016** 
1 0.011** 0.033** 0.017** 0.022** 0.024** 
2 0.024** 0.030** 0.024** 0.031** 0.026** 
3 0.021** 0.029** 0.029** 0.032** 0.017** 
4 0.033** 0.044** 0.041** 0.038** 0.032** 
5 0.027** 0.032** 0.026** 0.036** 0.031** 
6 0.033** 0.044** 0.037** 0.053* 0.044** 
7 0.054* 0.065* 0.040** 0.055* 0.068* 
8 0.037** 0.050* 0.043** 0.061* 0.065* 
9 0.054* 0.070* 0.062* 0.061* 0.066* 
10 0.043** 0.074* 0.056* 0.069* 0.062* 
11 0.053* 0.094* 0.079* 0.090* 0.089* 
12 0.044** 0.068* 0.097* 0.070* 0.082* 
13 0.066* 0.090* 0.115 0.095* 0.103 
14 0.073* 0.116 0.146 0.125 0.126 
15 0.041** 0.102 0.113 0.113 0.102 
16 0.047** 0.107 0.111 0.109 0.082* 
17 0.054* 0.092* 0.093* 0.104 0.077* 
18 0.053* 0.117 0.101 0.111 0.077* 
19 0.066* 0.126 0.113 0.119 0.103 
20 0.057* 0.113 0.114 0.106 0.095 
Notes: This table reports the p-values of the Corrado rank test on the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns. The abnormal returns of each stock are estimated using an estimation window of 212 observations 
(Schedule 13D and non-voice) and 198 observations (voice), respectively. * indicates statistical significance at 
level 10%; ** indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
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Table 13: Robustness - Corrado rank test results of the non-voice abnormal 
returns  
Models Market Model Carhart Model GARCH EGARCH GJR-GARCH 
Event Day      
-20 0.842 0.970 0.697 0.791 0.943 
-19 0.727 0.855 0.469 0.564 0.624 
-18 0.745 0.856 0.452 0.540 0.597 
-17 0.736 0.544 0.256 0.313 0.366 
-16 0.713 0.517 0.196 0.273 0.286 
-15 0.585 0.417 0.153 0.221 0.250 
-14 0.593 0.469 0.183 0.272 0.295 
-13 0.414 0.400 0.139 0.240 0.216 
-12 0.384 0.360 0.132 0.212 0.191 
-11 0.339 0.313 0.100 0.172 0.156 
-10 0.304 0.346 0.110 0.184 0.184 
-9 0.288 0.322 0.094* 0.172 0.140 
-8 0.245 0.277 0.075* 0.133 0.111 
-7 0.286 0.285 0.070* 0.144 0.111 
-6 0.310 0.307 0.089* 0.180 0.132 
-5 0.364 0.350 0.123 0.201 0.162 
-4 0.328 0.323 0.133 0.201 0.179 
-3 0.317 0.281 0.120 0.170 0.159 
-2 0.364 0.306 0.149 0.186 0.188 
-1 0.408 0.357 0.176 0.224 0.216 
0 0.463 0.397 0.208 0.264 0.241 
1 0.408 0.392 0.195 0.218 0.220 
2 0.465 0.450 0.220 0.262 0.251 
3 0.518 0.498 0.257 0.303 0.288 
4 0.574 0.560 0.307 0.352 0.350 
5 0.585 0.553 0.306 0.342 0.349 
6 0.548 0.531 0.293 0.323 0.339 
7 0.500 0.441 0.265 0.263 0.296 
8 0.538 0.472 0.281 0.261 0.339 
9 0.605 0.532 0.335 0.313 0.398 
10 0.658 0.590 0.393 0.373 0.443 
11 0.698 0.631 0.424 0.404 0.480 
12 0.692 0.628 0.428 0.405 0.488 
13 0.740 0.607 0.474 0.456 0.533 
14 0.743 0.584 0.412 0.399 0.470 
15 0.762 0.597 0.420 0.408 0.484 
16 0.679 0.599 0.409 0.445 0.480 
17 0.727 0.652 0.450 0.497 0.528 
18 0.754 0.625 0.379 0.463 0.442 
19 0.770 0.692 0.396 0.472 0.451 
20 0.829 0.748 0.443 0.528 0.509 
Notes This table reports the p-values of the Corrado rank test on the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. 
The abnormal returns of each stock are estimated using an estimation window of 212 observations (Schedule 13D 
and non-voice) and 198 observations (voice), respectively. * indicates statistical significance at level 10%; ** 
indicates statistical significance at level 5%;*** indicates statistical significance at level 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
